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INTRODUCTION 
In June 1985, a young Afghan refugee named Sharbat Gula, known at the time as simply ‘the 
Afghan girl’, captured the attention and the hearts of so many around the world when her 
piercing green eyes occupied the cover of National Geographic Magazine. Her picture had 
been taken by a photographer for National Geographic at a refugee camp on the border of 
Afghanistan and Pakistan where the young girl, her four siblings, and her grandmother shared 
a tent with half a dozen strangers.  It was here that Sharbat sought refuge from the destruction 
of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; she was six years old when Soviet bombing killed her 
parents. During the civil war which followed the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, ‘the 
Afghan girl’ retreated back to her village where she was married at the age of 16 and bore 
four children, one of which died in infancy. Her husband, unable to find work in Afghanistan, 
lives away from his family in Peshawar, Pakistan. Sharbat struggles to live with the heat and 
pollution of Peshawar in the summer because she suffers from asthma, so she is forced to live 
in a village in the Afghan mountains during this period. The one dollar per day her husband 
earns as a baker barely covers the medical bills they incur as a consequence of living in such 
poverty. According to her brother, except for perhaps her wedding day, Sharbat has never 
known a happy day in her life.
1
 
The tragedy and despair of Sharbat’s story is not uncommon within Afghanistan. The country 
has been ravaged by more than three decades of war, civil unrest, government repression, 
famine, and drought. Communist-inspired civil violence in the late 1970s was followed by 
the brutal war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Civil war plagued the country in the 
early 1990s before the callous Taliban regime assumed control over the country and set about 
establishing a repressive Islamic state. Finally, as the epicentre of international terrorism, 
Afghanistan was invaded in 2001 by a multilateral force led by the United States in a war 
which is ongoing in 2012. During this period, it is the people of Afghanistan that have borne 
the brunt of their country’s arduous circumstances. Tens of millions of Afghan civilians have 
been forcibly displaced within and without the borders of Afghanistan. At its height, the 
refugee crisis in Afghanistan accounted for roughly 60 per cent of the entire world refugee 
population, while it is estimated that as many as two out of three Afghans have been 
displaced at least once during this period. “There is not one family that has not eaten the 
                                                 
1
 For the full story of Sharbat Gula, see Cathy Newman, 'A Life Revealed', National Geographic Magazine, 
www.ngm.nationalgeographic.com/print/2002/04/afghan-girl/index-text, accessed 11 March 2012.   
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bitterness of war”, said a young Afghan merchant in the 1985 story that accompanied 
Sharbat’s photograph. In this destitute situation, the people of Afghanistan are heavily 
dependent upon the humanitarian commitment and compassion of the international 
community in order to survive. As respected Pakistani journalist, Rahimullah Yusufzai, 
explains, in Afghanistan “you live at the mercy of other people; more than that, you live at 
the mercy of the politics of other countries”.2  
The political context of international humanitarianism is precisely the topic of this thesis. 
Humanitarianism exists in order to respond to the kind of human suffering experienced in 
Afghanistan. Its core purpose, simply to provide assistance to those in the greatest of need, is 
a manifestation of human nature at its finest. It is a principle to which subscription is 
unanimously claimed within international politics. There are thousands of international non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), and state 
departments operating today whose professed purpose is to undertake humanitarian action 
around the globe. Many of these organisations are dependent upon the cooperation and 
support of sovereign states in order to operate successfully, both in terms of their funding and 
their access to state territories.  
As such, it is states that are the most important actors in the international humanitarian 
regime. The success of the international humanitarian regime is heavily dependent upon the 
extent to which the international community of states is committed to the principle of 
humanitarianism. Successful humanitarian action can only be facilitated by a community of 
states that is sincerely committed to the principle of humanitarianism. However, the opposite 
is also true that a community of states that is insincere in its commitment to humanitarianism 
invariably hampers the success of the international humanitarian regime. Because the 
international humanitarian regime is likely to be futile without the full support of states, the 
extent to which states are committed to the principle of humanitarianism is therefore of the 
utmost importance. The extent of this commitment will be explored in this thesis. 
The two specific areas of humanitarianism that this thesis will focus on are the areas of 
humanitarian intervention and refugee protection. These are two areas that have attracted a 
large degree of scholarly attention in the post-Cold War era, within which the political and 
ethical dimensions of acting in the name of humanity have featured prominently within 
                                                 
2
 Ibid. 
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intellectual debate. This topic was of particular interest following the high profile wars that 
took place in Afghanistan and Iraq, due to the fact that humanitarianism played an important 
role in legitimising these wars.
3
 Scholars of international relations began to dedicate more 
attention to the critical analysis of the dynamics of international humanitarianism, and the 
manner in which humanitarianism has been used by states to legitimise the pursuit of non-
humanitarian aims. 
Humanitarian Intervention 
The first area of focus in this thesis is on humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian 
intervention is a facet of humanitarianism that is concerned with the externally-oriented use 
of military force to assist those in need. States send military personnel and resources to 
intervene in the domestic affairs of other states with a view to correcting some internal 
imbalance or injustice that has resulted in great human suffering. In theory, the purpose of 
humanitarian intervention is simple as well as negative: solve the humanitarian crisis and 
then get out of the country and let the local population get on with their lives.
4
 It is not 
concerned with occupation or conquest, and the test of a genuine humanitarian intervention is 
that the intervening forces are in and out as quickly as possible.
5
 Pro-interventionists often 
understand humanitarianism as an act which takes place ‘over there’, far away from the 
territory of the state that is providing its assistance abroad. 
The largest concentration of intellectual debate on the topic of humanitarian intervention has 
been focused largely on questions around its legitimacy. The post-Cold War era has 
witnessed the return of the ‘good war’ in international politics, whereby humanitarianism has 
come to represent the primary method for justifying the use of military force.
6
 Helen Dexter 
explains that from the point of view of the international community, humanitarian 
intervention is no longer just one form of war, but has in fact become “virtually synonymous 
with permissible war itself”. The ‘new’ security challenges of the post-Cold War era 
necessitated a military response, but this military response was legitimised by appealing to 
the humanitarian principles of democracy and human rights. The US-led wars in Afghanistan 
                                                 
3
 A detailed discussion of the justifications provided for the intervention in Afghanistan can be found in Chapter 
3 of this paper. 
4
 Michael Walzer, 'The Politics of Rescue', Social Research, 62/1 (1995). p.70. 
5
 Ibid. p.70. 
6
 Helen Dexter, 'The 'New War' on Terror, Cosmopolitanism and the 'Just War' Revival', Government and 
Opposition, 43/1 (2008b). 
  
4 
 
and Iraq in the early 2000s fit firmly within this context, as both were framed within a 
humanitarian discourse. However, Dexter is highly critical of the concept of the ‘good war’ 
because, although the use of humanitarian rhetoric has increased since the post-Cold War era, 
she argues that this has not been matched by an increased commitment to the principles of 
humanitarianism. Rather, humanitarian rhetoric is being used more frequently by powerful 
states simply as an attempt to legitimise non-humanitarian, self-interested wars. Dexter 
questions the humanitarian credentials of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, claiming that their 
appeals to the principle of humanitarianism were considerably undermined by “the many 
civilian casualties, the use of torture, derogating from the Geneva Conventions, and 
prosecuting pre-emptive military campaigns”. Consequently, she warns that those who wish 
to support intervention for the sake of humanity but do not wish to see humanitarianism used 
as a pretext for unjust wars of self-interest “must tread carefully”. 
The legitimacy of humanitarian intervention is explored further by Alex Bellamy, who 
discusses the significance of the motivating factors that underlie humanitarian intervention.
7
 
The underlying intention of the intervening state is crucial because it is the intent, not the 
ostensible humanitarian outcome that may be produced, that it legitimised by the limited 
norm of humanitarian intervention. Ensuring that a genuine humanitarian intention underlies 
a humanitarian intervention helps to ensure, in theory at least, that humanitarian intervention 
remains truly humanitarian in nature. Bellamy explores the ‘motives versus outcomes’ debate 
and provides a comprehensive account of both sides of the argument. The most commonly 
held view among scholars is that it is a humanitarian motive alone that can legitimise a 
humanitarian intervention.
8
 However, there are those who disagree and insist that a 
humanitarian outcome is far more important than a humanitarian motive. Siding with the 
conventional view, Bellamy argues that a state’s motive for intervening is the most important 
criteria for assessing the legitimacy of an intervention. He claims that “intentions are products 
of motivations and outcomes are shaped by the strategies that one adopts to achieve ones 
aims”. Therefore, where interventions are motivated primarily by a humanitarian motive, it is 
likely that the intervening state will undertake the intervention in a manner that is conducive 
to enhancing the human welfare in the target country. On the other hand, allowing an 
intervention to be legitimised on the basis of an unintended humanitarian outcome risks 
                                                 
7
 Alex J. Bellamy, 'Motives, Outcomes, Intent and the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention', Journal of 
Military Ethics, 3/3 (2004). 
8
 Ibid. p.217; B. Parekh, ‘Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention’, International Political Science Review, 18/1 
(1997). p.54. 
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allowing humanitarianism to be used as a pretext for wars that may be based on an ulterior 
motive. 
Closely related to the ‘motives vs. outcomes’ debate are questions around the level of 
responsibility that an intervening state has towards the target state and its population. In 
contrast to a conventional military invasion, a humanitarian intervener has far greater and 
more clearly defined responsibilities towards its target state. According to Fatima Ayub and 
Sari Kouvo, the success of a humanitarian intervention should be measured on the basis of 
the durability of the government and the wellbeing of the civilian population of a target state.
9
 
At the core of the intervention must be a long-term strategy for stability and human security. 
However, Ayub and Kouvo claim that these areas have been “much neglected in the 
traditional humanitarian intervention”. States that undertake humanitarian intervention are 
rarely willing to commit the time and resources necessary to ensure that an adequate level of 
stability and human security is achieved.
10
 They point to the case of Afghanistan to 
demonstrate how the agendas of governance, political reform, and the promotion of human 
security were repeatedly sidelined by the intervening coalition of states for the sake of 
shorter-term political expediency. To the detriment of Afghanistan’s suffering population, the 
military elements of the intervention were prioritised ahead of the humanitarian elements. 
Ayub and Kouvo are highly critical of this and conclude that the disingenuous fusion of a 
military intervention with a humanitarian one that took place in Afghanistan raises “new 
difficulties for the paradigm... of humanitarianism and the justifiable use of force to protect 
vulnerable populations”. 
Refugee Protection 
The second area of focus in this thesis is the area of refugee protection. In contrast to the 
externally-oriented nature of humanitarian intervention, refugee protection is a more 
internally focused dimension of humanitarianism in that it often necessitates that states 
extend a sense of hospitality to those in need. Rather than taking place “over there”, states 
who commit to refugee protection are often required to resettle and support refugees within 
their own territory. Studies in the area of refugee protection have often focused on the level 
of responsibility that states have towards refugees and the extent to which they fulfil these 
                                                 
9
 Fatima Ayub and Sari Kouvo, 'Righting the Course? Humanitarian Intervention, the War on Terror and the 
Future of Afghanistan', International Affairs, 84/4 (2008). p.641. 
10
 Ibid. p.649. 
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responsibilities. Exploring the level of responsibility that the industrialised Western states 
have towards refugees, Matthew J. Gibney considers the ethical claims of the citizens of a 
state and those of refugees.
11
 He concludes that states have an inherent obligation to assist 
refugees up to the point that the costs of doing so begins to interfere with the fundamental 
responsibilities that a state has towards its own citizens. He argues that the principle of 
humanitarianism provides an ideal ‘rallying point’ for both sides because it is cautious 
enough in what it demands from states to be able to strike a compromise between the 
competing claims of both citizens and refugees. While states place great emphasis on 
fulfilling the needs of their citizens, Gibney maintains that the onus is on states to ensure that 
they have in place refugee policies that satisfy humanitarian requirements. 
Of course, no state today is willing to open up its borders in order to fulfil the demands of 
humanitarianism. Neither does any state today have a refugee policy that adequately satisfies 
the requirements of humanitarianism by doing all it can to assist refugees. In fact, many states 
actively try to avoid fulfilling their obligations to refugees. The international community of 
states has come under intense criticism from scholars of humanitarianism for not doing more 
to help ease the severity of the global refugee crisis.
12
 Jennifer Hyndman offers a critique of 
the manner in which many states attempt to contain refugees within their countries of origin 
rather than providing them with assistance abroad.
13
 She argues that the containment of 
refugees is an attempt to prevent displaced persons from crossing an international border, as 
it is only upon crossing an international border that refugees trade the entitlements of 
citizenship for the international protection provided by international legal arrangements, host 
governments, and humanitarian agencies. Hyndman maintains that the containment of 
refugees is merely a “donor-sponsored effort... to avoid international legal obligations to 
would-be refugees”. She believes that these kinds of practices expose the fallacy of the 
existing system of refugee protection which is grounded in a legal definition that emphasises 
the borders of states rather than in a geographical context that better meets the needs of those 
displaced. For Hyndman, this has created a geographically unequal system of refugee 
                                                 
11
 Matthew J. Gibney, 'Liberal Democratic States and Responsibilities to Refugees', The American Political 
Science Review, 93/1 (1999). p.176. 
12
 See for instance Jennifer Hyndman, Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism 
(Univ Of Minnesota Press, 2000); Arthur C. Helton, The Price of Indifference: Refugees and 
Humanitarian Action in the New Century (Oxford University Press, 2002); and B.S. Chimni, 
‘Globalization, Humanitarianism and the Erosion of Refugee Protection', Journal of Refugee Studies, 
13/3 (2000). 
13
 Hyndman, Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism, explores the controversy 
around ‘preventive protection’. This is discussed further in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
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protection that privileges the developed states of the West and hampers those regions of the 
world that are forced to host the bulk of the world’s refugees. 
Arthur Helton is similarly critical of what he perceives to be the half-hearted manner in 
which the international community of states responds to the global refugee crisis. Like 
Hyndman, Helton argues that the current system of refugee protection is in disarray. 
However, he is less critical of the structural basis of the existing system than he is of its 
policies, which he believes are not equipped to adequately address refugee crises.
14
 He 
accepts that the motivations for humanitarian action are not always benign, but he believes 
that whether selfish or altruistic “more effective humanitarian action will redound to the 
benefit of both individuals and states”. He therefore urges the international humanitarian 
regime to reform and reorganise its policies to better address the needs of displaced persons. 
Helton’s central argument is that in order to be successful, refugee policy reforms must 
account for the core interests of states. For this reason, states’ refugee policies will be most 
effective when they are incorporated into broader issues of foreign affairs. He maintains that 
while there is no single answer to the problem of human displacement, it remains a task of the 
international humanitarian regime to assess the needs of refugees and to align these as much 
as possible to the varied interests of states. 
States are not the only actors within the international humanitarian regime to come under 
criticism for failing to adequately respond to the needs of refugees. Some scholars have 
focused their critiques on the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
Scholars such as David Turton and Peter Marsden and Gill Loescher have criticised the 
UNHCR for the manner in which its political relationships with states has undermined its 
ability to fulfil its supposedly non-political mandate to protect refugees.
15
 David Turton and 
Peter Marsden provide a detailed analysis of the UNHCR’s operations in Afghanistan since 
2001 and explore the political context within which the agency’s refugee repatriation 
programme took place in late 2001. The programme facilitated the return of 1.7 million 
refugees from Iran and Pakistan to Afghanistan, yet Turton and Marsden argue that the 
repatriation programme was “in the interests neither of the majority of its intended 
beneficiaries (refugees) nor of the long term reconstruction of Afghanistan”. They claim that 
                                                 
14
 Helton, The Price of Indifference: Refugees and Humanitarian Action in the New Century. 
15
 See for instance Gil Loescher, The Unhcr and World Politics: A Perilous Path (Oxford University Press, 
2001) and David Turton and Peter Marsden, 'Taking Refugees for a Ride: The Politics of Refugee Return 
to Afghanistan’, Afghanistan Research and Evaulation Unit (2002). 
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the repatriation of refugees was an ‘unsustainable solution’ to the Afghan refugee crisis, as 
the conditions in Afghanistan were not suitable for the mass return of refugees. Turton and 
Marsden argue that the UNHCR was responding more to the political interests of its donors 
and host states than it was to the interests of the Afghan refugees. The repatriation 
programme was only launched because the UNHCR was in such a “weak position in relation 
to the policies of its funders and hosts” that it could not refute their policy demands. 
Assessing the State of Humanitarianism 
In taking into account the vast body of literature that exists on the topic of international 
humanitarianism, this thesis aims to provide a contribution to the field by way of an analysis 
of the dubious manner in which states apply the principles of humanitarianism. It derives 
conclusions around the level of commitment and sincerity of the international humanitarian 
regime to the principles of humanitarianism by exploring the dynamic relationship between 
the two areas of humanitarian intervention and refugee protection. From this analysis stems 
the two main arguments made herein. The primary argument is that while the governments of 
the wealthy Western states are often amongst the loudest trumpeters of humanitarian 
principles, they fail to live up to their humanitarian obligations. For, rather than committing 
to humanitarian action on the basis of need, they are only willing to commit to humanitarian 
action in cases that serve in their own national interests; cases of human suffering from which 
they do not stand to benefit remain caught in the margins of the international humanitarian 
regime. 
The secondary argument is a corollary of the primary argument in that there is a 
consequential relationship between the two. It claims that the international humanitarian 
regime remains overly focused on providing externally-oriented forms of humanitarian 
assistance at the expense of internally-oriented forms. States favour a strategy of providing 
humanitarian assistance as far away from their own territories as possible in order to maintain 
‘space and distance’ from the problems that may accompany humanitarian crises. In covetous 
circumstances, states are willing to provide financial resources or military assistance in order 
to ‘fix’ other countries abroad. However, they are explicitly averse to providing humanitarian 
assistance that may have an impact closer to home. This theory helps to explain why the same 
states that were so willing to contribute to the military intervention in Afghanistan were so 
eager to avoid their responsibilities to Afghanistan’s refugees. While states perceive 
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humanitarian intervention as a tool that may be utilised in the pursuit of their foreign policy 
goals, the admission of refugees within their borders is perceived as being detrimental to their 
national interests. It is in this context that this thesis suggests that the international 
humanitarian regime is driven primarily by the self-interests of the dominant states within the 
international system rather than by the altruistic principles upon which the regime is 
supposed to be founded. This thesis calls for a refocusing of the discussion of international 
humanitarianism from being centred upon outward humanitarian assistance to a more holistic 
approach towards humanitarian action whereby the actions taken reflect the specific human 
requirements of those in need. 
In pursuing this line of argument, chapter one, ‘Humanitarianism Explained’, begins with an 
explanation of the concept of humanitarianism and discusses the fundamental principles upon 
which the concept is premised. It then analyses the nature of humanitarianism in the 
contemporary era of international politics, focusing on the politicisation of humanitarianism 
that took place in the post-Cold War era which placed the international humanitarian regime 
in a complex state of disarray. The specific area of humanitarian intervention and refugee 
protection are then introduced as core components of international humanitarianism. 
Chapter two, ‘Afghanistan in Crisis’, introduces the case study of Afghanistan that will 
feature throughout this thesis. It provides an explanation of Afghanistan’s troubling history, 
culminating in the devastating humanitarian crisis that manifested around the turn of the 21
st
 
century. Chapter three, ‘Intervention in Afghanistan’, then explores the international response 
to the crisis by offering a critical discussion of the US-led international intervention in 
Afghanistan that began in October 2001. It demonstrates the willingness of the international 
community to contribute to the Afghan intervention and highlights the multilateral nature of 
the mission. Of particular importance in this chapter is the explanation of the various 
justifications that were offered for the intervention in Afghanistan, and the manner in which 
the intervention was framed as a case of humanitarian intervention. 
The focus of this thesis is then directed towards the refugee crisis that developed in 
Afghanistan during this period in chapter four, ‘Afghanistan’s Refugee Crisis’. Afghanistan’s 
history of refugees is briefly discussed before this chapter goes on to highlight the manner in 
which the international intervention in Afghanistan served to exacerbate the desperate 
situation of Afghanistan’s civilian population and create further displacement. Despite the 
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efforts of the US-led coalition to ‘fix’ Afghanistan through reconstruction efforts, the country 
remained in a precarious state and was unsuitable for refugee repatriation.  
Chapter five, ‘The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 
Afghanistan’, explores the politics surrounding the UNHCR’s operations in Afghanistan. It 
seeks to explain why the UNHCR adopted a policy of repatriation and returned a record 
number of refugees to Afghanistan despite the fact that this policy ran against the best 
interests of those refugees being repatriated. Chapter six, ‘The State Response to 
Afghanistan’s Refugee Crisis’, places the operations of the UNHCR in context by examining 
the manner in which the international community of states responded to the Afghan refugee 
crisis. It highlights the sense of reluctance that many states express towards sharing the 
‘refugee burden’ by exploring some of the various ways that states seek to avoid fulfilling 
their humanitarian obligations to refugees. The sense of distain that the many states expressed 
towards Afghan refugees is then highlighted in a case study of Australia’s explicit 
inhospitality towards Afghanistan’s refugees. 
Finally, chapter seven, ‘The Place of Humanitarianism in International Politics’, provides a 
concluding chapter that ties the preceding chapters together in a discussion of the major 
themes that emerged over the course of the thesis. It identifies the core problems with the 
existing international humanitarian regime and some of the major areas in which the regime 
fails to adequately uphold the principles of humanitarianism. Finally, this chapter then 
entertains some of the amendments and improvements to the international humanitarian 
regime that have been prescribed by some of the prominent scholars of international relations 
and considers their chances of achieving a desirable outcome. 
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CHAPTER 1: HUMANITARIANISM EXPLAINED 
 
Humanitarianism is the basic ethical principle that human beings have an incumbent duty to 
assist those in great distress. It is a principle that holds between strangers that share nothing 
in common other than their humanity. Humanitarianism has always had a strong presence in 
international politics, yet there are reasons for believing that it has never enjoyed the 
prominence that it enjoys today. The classical understanding of humanitarianism, guided by 
the principles of impartiality and neutrality, underwent a considerable shift in nature in the 
post-Cold War era of international politics. This shift resulted in a more politicised and more 
prominent form of humanitarianism which has been central to the promotion of a new liberal 
world order. It is within this context that the contemporary international humanitarian regime 
fell into a state of disarray as the international community’s response to humanitarian crises 
began to reflect the political agendas of the world’s most powerful states. 
The Principles of Classical Humanitarianism 
Born out of the highest ethical principles of international relations, humanitarianism is 
offered as a remedy for humanity’s worst suffering. It provides relief from suffering 
indiscriminately, whether that suffering is caused by nature or human conflict. 
Humanitarianism stems from the foundational principle of humanity, which may be defined 
as ‘the desire to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found...to protect 
life and health and to ensure respect for the human being’.1 The principle of humanity itself is 
derived from the doctrine of natural law. It maintains that human beings have certain moral 
duties to each other by virtue of their common human nature and that we are obliged to help 
those in need however we are able.
2
  It is this genuine desire to minimise human suffering 
that is at the heart of the principle of humanitarianism. 
The guiding light of international humanitarianism has traditionally been provided by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), founded in 1864. The centrality of the 
                                                 
1
 Jean Pictet, 'The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross: Commentary', International Red Cross 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/fundamental-principles-commentary-010179.htm, 
accessed 18 April 2011. 
2
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ICRC to the international humanitarian regime is highlighted by the fact that in 1986, the 
International Court of Justice refrained from providing a definition of the term 
‘humanitarianism’; it rather chose to simply equate its meaning with the work of the ICRC.3 
Today the ICRC operates in accordance with a set of seven fundamental principles that were 
established in 1965 by the Vice President of the Committee, Jean Pictet. These principles are:  
(1) the before-mentioned principle of humanity; (2) impartiality; (3) neutrality 
in conflict situations; (4) independence from any state or other organisation; 
(5) voluntary service; (6) unity within the Red Cross society; and (7) 
universality.4 
While each of these principles plays an important role in defining the unique character of the 
ICRC, the two most essential principles are those of impartiality and neutrality. Impartiality 
is essential to humanitarianism in that it ensures that victims are not distinguished according 
to any criteria other than their needs. Neutrality is a necessity for humanitarians to enjoy the 
confidence of all whereby they are able to retain access to the victims on both sides of a 
conflict. To attach any political, racial, religious, or ideological lens to humanitarianism 
would invariably undermine its legitimacy and effectiveness. Impartiality and neutrality are 
indispensible principles for creating the atmosphere of trust, without which humanitarian 
action would be inconceivable.
5
 Until recently, the role of these two principles as the basis of 
international humanitarianism was relatively uncontroversial.
6
 
Within international politics, subscription to the principle of humanitarianism is virtually 
unanimous. There are an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 international humanitarian non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) operating in the world today whose purpose is to provide 
protection and assistance to those in the greatest of need.
7
 These organisations range from 
those who provide general services to the needy, such as the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC), to those who focus on more specific humanitarian goals, such as the 
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International Rescue Committee (IRC) who focus on repatriating refugees within post-
conflict societies. There are also a number of inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) that 
are focused on international humanitarian issues, such as the Human Rights Council and High 
Commissioner for Refugees branches of the United Nations. Finally, most state governments 
in the world have dedicated foreign policy sectors and portions of their annual budgets to 
help alleviate humanitarian crises around the world.
8
 In this sense, the international 
community has recognised the importance of providing assistance to those in need and has 
lent its support to the operations of the international humanitarian regime. 
The Politicisation of Humanitarianism 
The nature of international humanitarianism underwent a distinct change following the end of 
the Cold War. The end of superpower conflict saw the international political system change 
in a manner that served to undermine the effectiveness of classical humanitarianism. From 
the early 1990s, the dynamics of international conflict underwent fundamental shift. The 
conventional grand wars between the world’s most powerful states gave way to civil conflict 
within states during which “civilians were targeted because of their religion or ethnicity.... 
and where children carried guns”.9 The belligerents in these civil conflicts were not state 
soldiers, but war criminals that showed complete disregard for international humanitarian 
law, targeted relief personnel, and seized foreign aid to fuel war economies. Conflicts such as 
those in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia in the early 1990s revealed the limitations of classical 
humanitarianism as humanitarian efforts failed miserably to assist the hundreds of thousands 
of victims of human rights abuse and genocide in these crises. Humanitarians began to accept 
the new conventional wisdom that suggested that there was ‘no humanitarian solutions to 
humanitarian problems’.10 Human rights violations and ethnic cleansing campaigns could not 
be remedied by humanitarianism alone; humanitarian action had political consequences and 
could therefore not be limited to reactive relief work.
11
 By the turn of the century, the 
international community had largely accepted the notion that humanitarianism had to 
renounce its traditional principles of impartiality and neutrality and become more politically 
oriented in order to be effective in the post-Cold War era of international politics. 
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In the context of this shift in the nature of humanitarianism, humanitarian action began to be 
viewed by humanitarians and political leaders alike as a tool through which to bring about 
positive political change around the globe. Humanitarian action and the promotion of liberal 
values such as human rights and democracy began to be seen by many as part of the same 
struggle for a more fair and peaceful world.
12
 Upon receiving the 2001 Nobel Peace Prize, 
United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan declared that “no walls can separate 
humanitarian or human rights crises in one part of the world from national security crises in 
the other”.13 Traditionalist organisations such as the ICRC or Medecins Sans Frontieres 
(MSF) argued that the fusion of political and humanitarian agendas, no matter how noble 
they may be, took humanitarianism beyond the role for which it was intended.  Nevertheless, 
by the late 1990s the international humanitarian regime had come to embrace the idea that the 
humanitarian action would be more effective by discarding the archaic apolitical rules and 
working in conjunction with the liberal ideology of the world’s most powerful states. 
However, this new politicised mode of humanitarianism has seldom been far from 
controversy. Clear tensions exist between the pursuit of political goals and the aims of 
humanitarianism. Yet the politicisation of humanitarianism has blurred the lines between the 
two, which has had a number of negative consequences for the international humanitarian 
regime.
14
 While the rules of the game have clearly changed around international humanitarian 
action, the international humanitarian regime have failed to articulate a coherent set of 
principles and practices to adequately respond to the humanitarian crises of the 21
st
 century.
15
 
Jennifer Hyndman explains how, in the absence of a clear and consistent framework for 
international humanitarian action, “a number of ad hoc and sometimes contradictory 
measures are being employed” to manage international humanitarian crises.16 Two of these 
measures, humanitarian intervention and refugee protection, form the basis of this thesis and 
are introduced in greater depth below. 
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Humanitarian Intervention 
At the heart of the debate over the nature of humanitarianism lies the question of its 
relationship to war. The integration of humanitarianism and human rights only makes sense 
in the context of a world in which military intervention is one of the standard responses to a 
humanitarian crisis.
17
 In this paper, humanitarian intervention is defined as:  
“the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states)  aimed at 
preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human 
rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state 
within whose territory force is applied.”18 
For natural law theorists, the moral obligation we have towards our fellow human beings “is 
the most basic ground... for interference in the internal affairs of one nation by outsiders”.19 
In his book De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace), the classical Dutch jurist 
Hugo Grotius argues that other states may exercise a right of forcible military action where a 
ruler “provokes their people to despair and resistance by unheard of cruelties”.20 
Humanitarian intervention is morally justified if it is undertaken to prevent the grave 
violation of the fundamental rights of humanity. In this view the international community of 
states has not only the right but also the moral obligation to punish those states that that 
excessively violate the rights of humanity as stipulated by the law of nature. 
 
The legality of humanitarian intervention is an issue that has attracted intense debate within 
international relations. At the heart of this debate are questions around the law of state 
sovereignty and its uneasy relationship with the principle of non-intervention. The principle 
of non-intervention was established in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and is enjoyed by 
states as a corollary of their sovereignty. The United Nations Charter affirms the principle of 
in Article 2.4, demanding that all member states “shall refrain... from the threat or use of 
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force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”.21 However, from 
the mid-1990s proponents of humanitarian intervention began to argue that sovereignty was 
not an inherent right of states, but rather a privilege afforded to those states that lived up to 
their responsibilities to their citizens.
22
 If states failed to uphold the rights of their citizens, 
they forfeited their right to sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention no longer 
applied to them. This concept of sovereignty as responsibility was enhanced in 2001 by a 
report issued by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
entitled The Responsibility to Protect. The report called for a “necessary recharacterisation 
[of sovereignty] from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility” in order to 
provide a basis from which the international community could act against states who violated 
the human rights of their citizens.
23
 The Responsibility to Protect report gained widespread 
support from the international community and in 2004 the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 
affirmed the report on behalf of the UN. This signalled a fundamental normative shift away 
from the traditional concept of sovereignty as an unconditional right of states towards the 
concept of sovereignty as responsibility. It also provided a firm legal framework to which 
states could appeal in order to justify the use of military force on humanitarian grounds. 
It is perhaps unsurprising that the period in which humanitarianism took on a more political 
nature and the concept of state sovereignty took on an alternate definition also bore witness to 
a sharp rise in the number of humanitarian interventions. Influenced by increasing quantities 
of scholarship supportive of intervention, as well as political figures such as George H.W. 
Bush and Kofi Annan and organisations like the ICISS, the international community began to 
subscribe to the idea that humanitarian intervention was an appropriate tool through which to 
bring about a new liberal world order based on universal human rights and democracy.
24
 As 
the ‘new’ political problems of the post-Cold War world unfolded, humanitarian intervention 
in non-liberal regimes around the world became increasingly viewed as the solution.
25
 It is 
within this context that the humanitarian interventions in Somalia in 1992, Bosnia in 1995, 
Kosovo and East Timor in 1999, and Afghanistan in 2001 took place. By the turn of the 21
st
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century, humanitarian intervention was no longer simply one form of war; it had become 
virtually synonymous with the idea of legitimate war.
26
 
Refugee Protection 
Whether legitimate or otherwise, war has a number of negative consequences for civilian 
populations. Other than death or severe injury, one of the most devastating consequences of 
war is forced displacement. Forced displacement has accompanied war from the earliest 
beginnings of human civilisation. Yet so too has the humanitarian response of granting refuge 
to those who have forcibly been displaced.
27
 References to the granting of refuge to displaced 
persons have been found in texts written 3,500 years ago during the development of the great 
early empires such as the Babylonians and ancient Egyptians. Granting refuge to those in 
great need has always been seen as a moral imperative. It was not until the mid-20
th
 century 
that forcibly displaced persons gained recognition as a legal status under the 1951 United 
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Refugee Convention). A legal 
status for refugees was necessitated by the vast number of persons who were displaced during 
the Second World War as a result of national and ethnic criteria being used to determine who 
belonged within which political community.
28
  
In the 1951 Refugee Convention, the term ‘refugee’ is defined as: 
“an individual who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of political 
opinion, race, religion, nationality, and membership in a social group are outside their 
country of nationality and are unable or, as a result of such fear, unwilling to return to 
it”.29 
This definition of a refugee has naturally been adopted by the international community of 
states as members of the UN. Yet this definition contains a number of limitations. Most 
importantly, it excludes internally displaced peoples (IDPs), such as the Kurds in Iraq, 
simply because they did not cross an international border. Moreover, it overlooks those 
who have been displaced as a result of general states of violence, such as civil wars, 
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rather than a specifically targeted persecution against their particular ethnicity, religion, 
and so on.
30
 In order to overcome these limitations, the term ‘refugee’ used in this paper 
will be intentionally broad in order to include the three categories of peoples seeking 
refuge: those displaced or in danger within their own countries (IDPs), those who have 
fled to foreign states, and those whose refugee status is pending definitive evaluation by 
the relevant national asylum system (commonly referred to as ‘asylum seekers’). 
Since the end of the Cold War, refugee issues have become intimately intertwined in 
evolving notions of humanitarianism
31
. The changed nature of warfare in the post-Cold War 
era has significantly worsened the plight of civilian populations within conflict zones. In fact, 
many humanitarian crises today are the result of localised wars within which combatants 
deliberately seek to engage in ‘displacement by design’.32 Civilian populations are frequently 
targeted and are often afforded no protection from their own states; it may even be their own 
governments that are threatening their safety. With their homes destroyed, their dignity lost, 
and their rights violated, these civilians caught up in the consequences of conflict are left with 
no alternative but to seek refuge in foreign lands. In this disconsolate situation, refugees 
become entirely dependent upon the humanitarian compassion of the international 
community in order to survive. 
The severity of the international refugee crisis today is difficult to fathom. The total 
population of concern to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
stood at a staggering 43.3 million at the end of 2009, the worst instalment of the global 
refugee crisis since the mid-1990s.
33
 This has increasingly commanded the attention of the 
international community in recent years. Richard Holbrooke, the Permanent Representative 
of the United States to the UN, stressed the importance of refugee issues by explaining that 
apart from the dead, refugees are the most obvious victims of political disasters. “How 
therefore can the [political] world turn away from people made homeless by political evil?”, 
he queried.
34
 Holbrooke conceded that while finding solutions to refugee crises is not cheap, 
the consequences of not dealing with them in a timely fashion are even greater because 
                                                 
30
 Gibney, 'Liberal Democratic States and Responsibilities to Refugees'. p.170. 
31
 Helton, The Price of Indifference: Refugees and Humanitarian Action in the New Century. p.3. 
32
 Ibid. p.276. 
33
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2009), 'UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2009', 
http://www.unhcr.org/4ce532ff9.html. accessed 29 April 2011. 
34
 Helton, The Price of Indifference: Refugees and Humanitarian Action in the New Century. p.1. 
  
19 
 
refugee crises can have an undermining effect on political stability in the future.
35
 So while 
humanitarian compassion should be the primary motivator for assisting refugees, doing so 
also makes sense in the context of the political and strategic considerations of states. 
The moral obligation that states have towards refugees is clearly stipulated by the principle of 
humanitarianism. Humanitarianism does demand that states commit to assisting refugees. Yet 
it is cautious in what it demands from states and tries to strike a balanced compromise 
between the competing claims of citizens and refugees.
36
 Humanitarianism requests that 
states accept refugees up to point that certain costs are incurred. It does not expect states to 
assist refugees to the point that it is unable to fulfil its primary responsibilities to its own 
citizens;
37
 as the cost of assisting refugees increasingly impinges upon a state’s commitment 
to its citizens, a state’s duty to assist refugees subsequently decreases. However, in applying 
the humanitarian standard, states are expected to demonstrate that they are doing what they 
can within their limits to help reduce the vast number of refugees in the world. As Matthew 
Gibney explains, “the onus [is] on state officials to give a reasoned defence of why they 
believe their current policies are satisfying humanitarianism’s requirements”.38 So for 
instance, in New Zealand, refugees constitute less than ten percent of the approximately 
50,000 new entrants the country accepts each year. To apply the humanitarian standard, the 
New Zealand government would need to justify how this policy represents its maximum 
ability to contribute towards easing the refugee crisis. In placing this expectation on states, 
the principle of humanitarianism has the potential to ease the severity of the global refugee 
crisis by improving the refugee policies of states. 
The international community’s legal responsibilities towards refugees are also clear. Various 
sources of international law recognise and protect the legal rights of refugees. For instance, 
Article 14(1) of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that “everyone 
has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution”.39 Article 33 of 
the Refugee Convention similarly affirms the law of non-refoulement, which prohibits states 
from expelling a refugee to a country in which “his life or freedom would be threatened”.40 
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The preamble to the Refugee Convention also stresses the importance of ‘burden-sharing’ as 
an essential means of solving refugee crises.
41
 It recognises that because granting refuge to 
large numbers of refugees may place an ‘unduly heavy burden’ on some countries, there must 
be a high degree of international cooperation on refugee issues in order to share this burden.
42
 
However, to the detriment of the world’s refugees, there is great disparity in the extent to 
which states are willing to share this burden. Many states perceive humanitarianism as an 
external phenomenon; while they are willing to support humanitarian action on the other side 
of the world by contributing foreign aid or troops to humanitarian interventions, many states 
are reluctant to apply the principles of humanitarianism within their own borders.
43
 In the 
context of the global refugee crisis, this results in states seeking to minimise the number of 
refugees they resettle in their countries. These kind of practices by states will be discussed in 
greater depth in chapter six of this thesis. 
 
In the post-Cold War era of international politics, international humanitarianism became 
increasingly complex. The traditional distinction between humanitarianism and the political 
agendas of the world’s states became blurred as the international community began to view 
humanitarian action as a tool through which to construct and enforce a new liberal world 
order based upon universal human rights and democracy. This overt politicisation of 
humanitarianism resulted in the creation of a number of dubious humanitarian policies that 
sought to achieve humanitarian and political goals simultaneously. This thesis explores two 
such policies, humanitarian intervention and refugee protection, in the context of the tensions 
that existed between the humanitarian and political goals of the 2001 US-led war in 
Afghanistan. 
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CHAPTER 2: AFGHANISTAN IN CRISIS 
 
While the troublesome history of modern Afghanistan is well documented, it is not always 
well understood. Prior to 2001 Afghanistan had already been ravaged by more than two 
decades of conflict and humanitarian tragedy. Afghanistan had been at the centre of 
international attention in the 1980s as the axis of superpower interest in the context of the 
Cold War. As such, Afghanistan received vast amounts of financial and military assistance 
from the US in support of its resistance against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However, 
once the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended, Afghanistan was relegated to the 
sidelines of international concern. During the 1990s it struggled to cope with a devastating 
civil war, followed by a repressive governmental regime, alongside severe drought and 
famine. It was during this period that Afghanistan developed into a major threat to 
international peace and security and fell victim to one of the worst humanitarian crises in 
modern history. 
The Violent History of Afghanistan 
The full extent of the tragedy that fell upon Afghanistan in the early 21
st
 century can only be 
understood by recognising the incessant state of conflict that plagued the country over the 
preceding two decades. The chain of events that culminated in the Afghan war of 2001 began 
as early as 1978 when the Marxist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) 
overthrew the government of Muhammad Daoud. Despite being backed by the Soviet Union, 
the PDPA’s grip on power was fragile and faced frequent opposition from the Afghan 
population. In the context of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was determined to maintain a 
Marxist regime in Afghanistan and in December 1979 invaded Afghanistan in an attempt to 
suppress an uprising against the PDPA. The Soviet invasion took a brutal toll on the Afghan 
population, which was often subjected to torture and collective punishment.
1
 The Soviet 
invasion instantly transformed Afghanistan into a country of strategic significance for the US 
and its Western allies.
2
 A local insurgency in resistance to the Soviet invasion had been 
mounted by a loosely allied group of mujahideen, or Islamic holy warriors, and the US saw 
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this group as an ideal mechanism for weakening the Soviet Union by engaging it in 
protracted guerrilla warfare. The US seized the opportunity to provide the mujahideen with 
financial, military, and humanitarian supplies in support of its resistance to the Soviet Union. 
This resulted in a decade-long war between the mujahideen and the Soviet Union which 
devastated Afghanistan and its civilian population. It is estimated that from a total population 
of 16.4 million, more than 1.5 million Afghans were killed, 4.2 million were maimed or 
disabled, and more than 7 million were displaced as a result of the war.
3
 
The war also exhausted the Soviet Union, who withdrew from Afghanistan in February 1989. 
After supporting the mujahideen for so long, the Soviet withdrawal sparked the end of the 
US’ strategic interest in Afghanistan. By 1990, Afghanistan had virtually fallen off the radar 
of the international community and the Afghans were largely left on their own to rebuild their 
devastated country.
4
 Without the support of the Soviet Union the PDPA relinquished control 
of the country and a mujahideen-led government rose in its place. This was met with genuine 
hope and anticipation among Afghans, who expected the mujahideen to usher in an era of 
peace and stability in Afghanistan. However, this optimism was short lived as it quickly 
became apparent that internal power battles between the major leaders within the mujahideen 
government would prevent it from achieving any political stability in Afghanistan.
5
 Within a 
matter of months Afghanistan was again plunged into a state of conflict, this time civil war 
between the ethnic divisions within the mujahideen. The war pitted the majority Pushtun 
population in the south and east of the country against the ethnic minorities of Tajik, Uzbek, 
Hazara, and Turkmen of the north.
6
 
It was in 1994 that a predominantly Pushtun force known as the Taliban emerged as a force 
to be reckoned with in the south. The Taliban was comprised primarily of young Afghan 
refugees living in Islamic madrasahs (seminaries) in Pakistan. It was supported by the anti-
Western political party Jamiat-ul-Islam (JUI) of Pakistan and the ultraconservative Wahhabi 
branch of Islam in Saudi Arabia. With financial backing from the Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia, 
JUI established hundreds of madrasahs in Pakistan’s Pushtun belt, from which Afghan 
refugees were offered free education in fundamentalist Islamic teachings, as well as food, 
shelter, and military training. These madrasahs proved to be ripe breeding grounds for 
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Taliban recruitment.
7
 The Taliban preached that the solution to Afghanistan’s problems was 
to be found in the creation of a strict Islamic state. It had managed to bring some level of 
relative peace and stability to the parts of the country it controlled, and this had raised its 
popularity among the Afghan population.
8
 Recruiting from the madrasahs also gave the 
Taliban a strong military advantage over its rivals for political control of Afghanistan. In 
1994 the Taliban gained control of Afghanistan’s second largest city, Kandahar, with the loss 
of only a dozen men. In 1995 they took Herat, in 1996 Jalalabad and the capital Kabul, and in 
1998 Mazar-i-Sherif. Finally, in September 2000 they took the last major city outside of their 
control, Taloqan. The Taliban’s extremist ideology and authoritarian system of government 
made it increasingly unpopular within the international community, which imposed trade and 
diplomatic sanctions against Afghanistan in response.
9
 In spite of this, the Taliban held firm 
political control of the country heading into the new millennium. 
Afghanistan’s Growing Security Threat 
Under the control of the Taliban, Afghanistan developed into a multifaceted threat to 
international peace and security. Afghanistan’s troubles had been largely contained within its 
immediate environment prior to the Taliban’s accession to power, but this changed under the 
Taliban’s regime.10 Part of the threat it posed the international community was as a major 
source and trafficker of narcotics. Drug cultivation and trafficking was the Taliban’s largest 
source of income.
11
 The UN Drug Control Programme reported in 1999 that Afghanistan 
produced more opium than the rest of the world put together, making the Taliban the largest 
heroin producer in the world.
12
 Around Kandahar, poppy fields stretched as far as the eye 
could see, while in Herat, the Taliban set up model farms where farmers were able to learn 
the best methods of heroin cultivation. Vast amounts of heroin were exported internationally 
from Afghanistan, and with a 20 percent tax collected from dealers, this money went directly 
into the Taliban’s war chest.  
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Another area of international concern, particularly in the Middle Eastern region, was around 
the smuggling of international trade commodities in and out of Afghanistan. The smuggling 
of international trade goods made up the Taliban’s second-largest source of income.13 The 
World Bank estimated that in 1999 the smuggling of consumer goods, fuel, and food products 
in and out of Afghanistan amounted to $5 billion, a figure which surpassed Afghanistan’s 
total GDP. This flow of illegal trade crippled the local industry in Afghanistan and many 
other states in the region, as local producers were unable to compete with the foreign-made, 
duty-free goods being smuggled into their markets. It also undermined the effectiveness of 
the international trade sanctions in place against Afghanistan, as the Taliban were able to 
obtain whatever they required through the black market. 
But the greatest threat that the Taliban’s Afghanistan posed to the rest of the world came 
from the fusion of fundamentalist Islam and terrorism. While Afghanistan had always been a 
deeply conservative Muslim country, the traditional form of Islam practiced in Afghanistan 
was also highly tolerant. As such, none of Islam’s extreme orthodox sects, such as 
Wahhabism, had ever been able to take root in Afghanistan.
14
 Under the Taliban this changed 
dramatically as Afghanistan was transformed into a hub of Islamic fundamentalism and an 
exporter of extremist Islamic ideology. Islam became a lethal weapon in the hands of the 
Taliban. It imposed a fundamentalist system of Islam based upon a strict form of sharia law 
and a crude interpretation of the notion of jihad (religious struggle) upon which it justified 
the killing of its enemies – Muslims of different sects and Western infidels - in the name of 
God. This system inspired and nurtured a new generation of violent Islamic fundamentalists 
who, during the 1990s, sought to carry out Taliban-style revolutions throughout the Middle 
East and beyond.
15
 Radical Islam was exported from Afghanistan to Chechnya in Russia, 
Kashmir in India, and even as far as Xinjiang in China. The Taliban’s Information Minister, 
Amir Khan Muttaqi, boasted that “[our] prestige is spreading across the region because we 
have truly implemented Islam, and this makes the Americans and some of our neighbours 
very nervous”.16  
As the Taliban’s influence grew across the region, containing the spillover of Islamic 
extremism from Afghanistan developed into a major concern of the international community. 
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The Taliban readily harboured foreign Islamic extremists that had engaged in terrorist 
activities in their own countries.
17
 Terrorists from Iran, Uzbekistan, and China among others, 
all found refuge in Afghanistan under the Taliban. However, it was the Taliban’s well known 
support of Osama bin Laden and his transnational terrorist network al-Qaeda that had the 
most devastating effect on international peace and security. Bin Laden was a key figure in the 
mujahideen’s resistance against the Soviet invasion in the 1980s. But after being supported 
by the US during this period, bin Laden had turned against the US after it established military 
bases in his native Saudi Arabia in the early 1990s. He perceived the US as an imperialist 
power whose presence in the Middle East was both exploiting and corrupting the Islamic 
world.
18
 After striking up a friendship with the Taliban chief Umar, bin Laden established 
terrorist training camps in Afghanistan in 1997 from which he planned various terrorist 
attacks against the US and its allies. It was from Afghanistan that bin Laden masterminded 
the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the US Navy destroyer 
Cole in 2000, and World Trade Centre and Pentagon in the US in September 2001. Backed 
by the UN Security Council, Washington demanded that bin Laden be extradited from 
Afghanistan to face justice in the US, but the Taliban refused to comply. The Taliban’s 
harbouring of bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network served as one of the main reasons for the 
US-led ‘war on terror’ that began in Afghanistan in October 2001. It also ultimately proved to 
be beginning of the end of the Taliban’s period of control in Afghanistan, as the regime was 
removed from power in early 2002. 
Afghanistan’s Humanitarian Crisis 
By 2001 the combination of more than two decades of incessant conflict and the Taliban’s 
repressive governmental regime culminated in one of the worst humanitarian disasters of 
modern history. The earliest signs of a humanitarian crisis long preceded the events of 
September 2001. Civilians in Afghanistan began to feel the humanitarian consequences of 
war as early as 1978 during the violent PDPA-led Saur Revolution.
19
 But it was as a result of 
the devastation that accompanied the Soviet invasion that Afghanistan was placed in the 
destitute humanitarian situation within which it remained trapped for so long. The war with 
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the Soviet Union had a devastating effect on Afghanistan’s infrastructure; thousands of 
homes were destroyed, roads were damaged, and the facilities needed to provide basic 
services such as electricity and water were not functioning adequately. More importantly, it 
also created political instability within the Afghan government, which made it impossible for 
Afghanistan to resolve the developing humanitarian crisis on its own.
20
 By the early 1990s, 
Afghan citizens were almost entirely dependent upon foreign aid in order to survive.
21
 
Perversely, the defeat of the Soviet Union in 1989 saw the total withdrawal of US assistance 
to Afghanistan at the precise point that it was required more than ever to recover and 
rebuild.
22
 International NGOs functioned as the main providers of key services such as 
education, healthcare, demining, and food and water distribution. But this assistance was 
unable to adequately compensate for the absence of functioning state structures in 
Afghanistan.  
As the decade progressed the humanitarian crisis duly worsened. This was in part a 
consequence of the repressive system of government that was introduced by the Taliban. It 
imposed a particularly repressive vision of Islamic propriety, which included severe 
restrictions on women’s activities, education, and social and cultural life.23 It banned 
television and videos, imposed inhumane sharia punishments such as stoning and 
amputation, forced women to adopt the restrictive Taliban dress code, and prohibited them 
from even leaving their homes without a male family member escort. The brutal manner in 
which the Taliban imposed these regulations resulted in widespread human rights violations 
against the Afghan population.
24
 Taliban soldiers often forcibly displaced people from their 
homes; burnt houses; summarily executed civilians, including women and children; raped and 
beat women; and performed public hangings, stoning to death, and beheadings.
25
 The Afghan 
population remained trapped in a state of extreme poverty and fear, helplessly subordinate to 
the Taliban regime and its repressive methods.
26
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As though life was not difficult enough at this point, the grave humanitarian situation in 
Afghanistan was exacerbated by the worst drought conditions in living memory. Afghans 
already had great difficulty in obtaining drinking water due to the high risk of water 
contamination due to their over-reliance on wells. But the drought that began in 1999 in the 
north and continued into 2000 and 2001 in the south and east made conditions even worse. It 
is estimated that during this period, up to 85 percent of the population were forced to live 
without access to running water.
27
 The drought also affected Afghanistan’s agriculture and 
food production by hampering the growth of crops and killing vast amounts of livestock, 
which resulted in a severe famine. The international aid community tried to provide some 
level of assistance to Afghanistan, but it struggled to have any meaningful effect due to the 
fact that its efforts were frequently obstructed by the Taliban.
28
 The Taliban restricted access 
to the needy, arrested aid workers, and even attacked UN personnel from the World Food 
Program, making it more and more difficult for aid workers to reach those in need. With 
more than 1 million Afghans facing severe famine conditions, tens of thousands abandoned 
their homes in search of food. In September 2001 the World Food Programme reported that 
in some areas, people were surviving by eating grass and locusts.
29
 The UN accurately 
described the situation in Afghanistan as “a humanitarian crisis of stunning proportions” and 
urged greater assistance from the international community.
30
 
 
When the events of September 11 2001 thrust Afghanistan back into the international 
spotlight, what was exposed was an unstable and threatening country in the grip of a 
devastating humanitarian tragedy. A deadly cocktail of more than two decades of conflict, an 
aggressive and repressive governmental regime, and famine and drought had placed 
Afghanistan in a precarious situation. It posed a major threat to international peace and 
security which demanded a strong international response. Afghanistan’s civilian population 
were also suffering in a humanitarian crisis for which international intervention was long 
overdue. By October 2001 it had become clear to the international community that it could no 
longer afford to turn a blind eye to the situation in Afghanistan. 
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CHAPTER 3: INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
Al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks on the US proved to be the catalyst for the international action 
against Afghanistan. Following the attacks the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed a series 
of resolutions against international terrorism. Citing these resolutions, the US gathered 
international support and formed a coalition of countries to undertake an intervention in 
Afghanistan, with one of its professed goals being to address the escalating crisis in the 
country. It has been suggested that the international community was forthcoming in its 
support in the context of the global war on terror, and that the Afghan intervention should 
therefore not be classed as a humanitarian intervention.
1
 However, Afghanistan’s 
humanitarian crisis played an important role in legitimising the intervention; humanitarian 
justifications were vigorously invoked by the coalition in order to foster a greater degree of 
international support for the intervention. The humanitarian and the security rationales for the 
Afghan intervention were inextricably linked and were mutually reinforcing. As such, while 
the intervention may have been primarily framed in the context of the war on terror, the 
humanitarian dimension cannot be overlooked. 
Momentum Towards Intervention in Afghanistan 
The deteriorating situation in Afghanistan began to command an increasing level of 
international concern from the late 1990s. International pressure on the Taliban steadily grew 
as a number of international organisations began to raise awareness for the plight of the 
Afghan civilian population. In 1998 the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights expressed its “deep concerned at the increasingly deteriorating human rights 
situation in Afghanistan”.2 Various human rights watchdogs, such as Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch, also began to strongly denounce the Taliban regime on the 
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grounds of its poor human rights record.
3
 The UNSC’s grave concern for the situation in 
Afghanistan was reflected by the fact that it passed a total of nine resolutions on Afghanistan 
between 1996 and 2001. Of these nine resolutions, the most significant were resolutions 
1267, which established a sanctions regime against the Taliban, and 1333 which prohibited 
military ties with Afghanistan. 
Yet it was not until October 2001 that international military force was taken against 
Afghanistan. The UNSC was determined to combat the growing threat to international peace 
and security posed by terrorism. It passed Resolution 1368 which recognised the inherent 
right of states who were victims of terrorism to use military force in self defence. The US-led 
coalition evoked resolution 1368 in support of its decision to use military force against 
Afghanistan for its support and harbouring Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network. The 
UNSC also passed resolutions 1373 and 1386 shortly following the onset of military force 
against Afghanistan which further condemned Afghanistan for its support of international 
terrorism and expressed support for the intervention. But the intervention simultaneously 
contained an inherent humanitarian component. This was emphasised by UNSC resolution 
1383 which urged the international community to provide “urgent humanitarian assistance to 
alleviate the suffering of Afghan people” and “long-term assistance for the... rehabilitation of 
Afghanistan”.4 The US and the UNSC established a number of international organisations to 
oversee the distinct security and humanitarian dimensions of the intervention. The following 
chapter looks at some of these key organisations in greater depth. 
Justifying the Intervention in Afghanistan 
Reflecting the multifaceted threat that Afghanistan posed to the world in October 2001, the 
countries who participated in the international intervention in Afghanistan provided varying 
justifications for their involvement. While some countries focused primarily on the security 
threat that Afghanistan posed and international terrorism, others chose to justify their 
involvement on diplomatic and humanitarian grounds. In the post-Cold War world, the 
humanitarian and foreign policies of states became increasingly interrelated. This was 
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reflected by the fact that the humanitarian and security justifications for the intervention in 
Afghanistan were inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing.
5
 However, it is important to 
examine the role that the respective rationales played in justifying the intervention in order to 
understand how legitimacy is sought through proposed legal and normative distinctions 
between military force and humanitarian intervention.
6
 The following section aims to 
determine the extent to which the humanitarian rationale in particular proved decisive in 
legitimising the intervention in Afghanistan. 
There is a general disagreement that exists around the primary motive behind the intervention 
in Afghanistan. This disagreement is broadly divided into two main camps. The first argues 
that the intervention was primarily justified by the security concerns of the international 
community, and the US in particular, following the September 2001 terrorist attacks.
7
 It is in 
this context that US President George W. Bush announced that the US had the right to secure 
itself against those countries that harboured or gave aid to terrorist groups. In what would 
commonly become known as the Bush Doctrine, Bush declared that “If you feed a terrorist, if 
you fund a terrorist, you’re a terrorist. And... [we] will hold you just as responsible for the 
actions that take place on American soil”.8 It is also in this context that the US informed the 
UN Security Council on 7 October 2001 that it was launching military strikes on Afghanistan 
after the Taliban rejected the American’s request to extradite the al-Qaeda leaders it was 
harbouring. Fatima Ayub and Sari Kouvo argue that “never was there an argument made that 
the US war in Afghanistan was anything other than a unilateral use of force in self-defence”.9 
The Security Council accepted the US action as a legitimate exercise in self-defence and 
supported the military effort in Afghanistan by authorising the creation of ISAF under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
Those who subscribe to this view reject the notion that humanitarian concerns had any 
motivating effect on the international community’s decision to intervene in Afghanistan. 
According to Tony Smith, the call for democracy and human rights in Afghanistan was 
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nothing more than “an integral part of a power play by Washington to control the entire 
Middle East for the sake of the ‘war on terror’”.10 Proponents of this view highlight the fact 
that despite suffering a devastating humanitarian disaster for years during the 1990s, the 
international community did not lend its support to undertake a humanitarian intervention. 
When intervention did come in 2001, it was not for the sake of the Afghan people but as a 
result of a sudden and dramatic shift in the American national interest. As Ayub and Kouvo 
explain, the Afghan mission only took on a humanitarian dimension when the initial plan for 
a swift military operation “[became] blurred by complex questions of long-term stabilisation 
and state-building”.11 
This argument is supported by the justifications offered by the Australian government for the 
country’s contribution to the intervention. Australia was the first country to offer its full 
support to the United States following the September 11 attacks.
12
 Australian Prime Minister 
John Howard was visiting Washington at the time of the attacks and immediately invoked the 
mutual-defence clauses of the ANZUS Treaty for the first time since it was enacted in 1952. 
He declared that “at no stage should any Australian regard this as something that is just 
confined to the United States. It is an attack upon the way of life we hold dear in common 
with the Americans”.13 Australia’s support over the following months continued to be based 
on combating the threat of terrorism. It was clear that Howard’s primary reason for sending 
Australian troops to Afghanistan was to contribute to the ‘war on terror’. The language of 
humanitarianism was notable only in its absence as Howard repeatedly stressed the 
importance of “banishing terrorism from the face of the earth”.14 Australia was eager to 
reinvigorate its relationship with the United States and become a willing partner in the post-
9/11 world.
15
 It did so by taking a hard-line on terrorism and lending its unequivocal support 
for the US-led wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq. 
As Australia’s presence in Afghanistan remained throughout the decade, it continued to be 
justified in the context of the ‘war on terror’. The terrorist attacks in Bali that had killed 88 
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Australians in 2002 shocked the Australian public and reinforced the resolve of the 
Australian government in its anti-terrorism efforts. The threat of terrorism dominated the 
discourse within Australian politics and the media.
16
 The government maintained public 
support for Australia’s involvement in Afghanistan by framing the war as a matter of 
Australian national interest; Howard expressed his “very strong belief that it is in Australia’s 
national interest to prevent Afghanistan.....becoming a safe haven for terrorists”.17 Howard’s 
successor Kevin Rudd similarly maintained that the purpose of Australia’s involvement in 
Afghanistan was to “help protect innocent people, including innocent Australians, from being 
murdered by terrorists”.18 In 2010 Prime Minister Julia Gillard continued this theme by 
claiming that Australia was in Afghanistan “because we do not want Afghanistan to become a 
safe haven for terrorists to train and then come and take Australian lives”.19 The 
government’s strong stance on terrorism resonated with the Australian public, which strongly 
supported tougher national security measures and the fight against international terrorism.
20
 
While the rationales offered for Australia’s involvement in Afghanistan support the argument 
that the intervention was not motivated by humanitarian concerns, to a large extent this 
argument overlooks the significance of the point in question. What is at issue at here is not 
whether the United States and its allies were sincere in their motives for intervention, but that 
they felt it was necessary to publicly defend the intervention in humanitarian terms.
21
 It is 
clear that in the post-Cold War world, the language of humanitarianism has become an 
important means of legitimising actions taken in pursuit of policy objectives which are not 
inherently humanitarian. In the case of Afghanistan, this was reflected by the fact that the 
US-led coalition felt the need to invoke a humanitarian rationale alongside that of self-
defence/anti-terrorism rationale.
22
  
The humanitarian rationale featured prominently in the speeches made by coalition political 
leaders. George W. Bush declared that “the oppressed people of Afghanistan will know the 
generosity of America and its allies. As we strike military targets, we’ll also drop food, 
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medicine, and supplies to the starving and suffering men and women and children of 
Afghanistan”.23 This pledge was echoed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for 
Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs, Joseph J. Collins. Collins claimed that not only had 
“military actions not slowed humanitarian assistance”, but rather they had in fact served to 
“accelerate humanitarian assistance”.24  
The language of humanitarianism was also frequently used by British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair. Blair claimed that there were “three parts, all equally important, to the operation in 
which we are engaged: military, diplomatic, and humanitarian”.25 He was eager to point out 
that, “while the military action continues...., we are establishing a huge humanitarian effort to 
feed and shelter as many refugees as we can”.26 In the early days of military action, Blair was 
also eager to point out that the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan was not the result of the 
coalition intervention, but rather the “cruel, dictatorial and oppressive” nature of the Taliban 
regime that had caused the displacement of 4.5 million Afghan refugees in the pre-September 
11 era.
27
  He maintained that the coalition was bringing about a permanent solution to the 
crisis and improving the lives of the Afghan civilian population. Military action was an 
unfortunate yet necessary step in order to achieve this change. Blair conceded that, “although 
conflict is never easy or pleasant, to see women and children smiling after years under one of 
the most brutal and oppressive regimes in the world is finally to understand the true meaning 
of the word ‘liberation’”.28  
The Dutch government also placed a strong emphasis on the humanitarian dimension of the 
intervention in justifying its involvement in Afghanistan. The Netherlands’ initial deployment 
in late 2001 was made to provide support only to the humanitarian effort, with the Dutch 
Prime Minister Wim Kok announcing that the Dutch forces and equipment would “not be 
involved in any attacks in Afghanistan”.29 This decision reflected view of the Dutch 
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government that NATO’s operational strategy in Afghanistan should be “as military as 
necessary, as civilian as possible”. The Dutch government frequently stressed that the 
international mission should emphasise the humanitarian elements of the mission, such as 
reconstruction and civilian welfare, more than combat operations.
30
 For Nicholas Wheeler, 
the fact that the humanitarian rationale was invoked alongside that of self defence by the US 
and its allies represents an implicit admission on behalf of the coalition that the humanitarian 
rationale was a necessary enabling condition of the intervention.
31
 
Proponents of the humanitarian view therefore reject the claim that the Afghan intervention 
was not a humanitarian intervention. Some go as far as to claim that the humanitarian 
rationale proved much more critical in legitimising the intervention than the self-defence 
rationale.
32
 Vasuki Nesiah, for instance, argues that the “post-Cold war dialogue on 
humanitarian intervention in furtherance of international norms” played a much more crucial 
role in legitimising the intervention in Afghanistan than the “legalistic elaboration of self-
defence arguments”.33 She maintains that it was the heavily emphasised discussions about the 
humanitarian situation in the context of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine being drafted 
around the time of the intervention that created the space for military intervention by giving 
the coalition the moral authority to challenge the leadership and practices of the Taliban 
government. Others adopt a more liberal view and highlight the mutually reinforcing nature 
of the respective rationales. Piki Ish-Shalom points to the claim put forward by the coalition 
leadership that the values and interests of the coalition were united.
34
 He explains that the 
promotion of humanitarian values, such as freedom and democracy, was part of the 
coalition’s strategy in fighting global terrorism in that it aimed to “create a balance of power 
that favours human freedom”.35 This view highlights the extent to which the security and 
humanitarian justifications for the intervention overlapped and were used alongside each 
other to gain international support for the intervention. 
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The Military Elements of the Intervention 
Reflecting the military dimensions of the intervention, two multilateral military organisations 
were established in 2001 to confront the security threat posed by Afghanistan. The first was 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), a coalition of countries led by the US Central Command 
(CENTCOM) committed to a global counter-terrorism campaign. OEF was comprised of 
several distinct counter-terrorism operations including operations in the Philippines, the Horn 
of Africa, and Kyrgyzstan. The Afghan operation of OEF was the largest and most complex, 
with more than 60 countries in total contributing military forces or equipment to the Afghan 
mission.
36
 OEF coordinated the first military strikes against Afghanistan on 7 October 2001. 
US and British forces began bombing Taliban targets and al-Qaeda training camps as part of 
OEF’s primary purpose to expel the Taliban government from Afghanistan and to shut down 
the al-Qaeda’s terrorist training camps in the country. OEF succeeded in these achieving 
these goals after just two months. However, it remained in Afghanistan to conduct 
‘counterinsurgency’ operations, assist Afghan security forces (ASF) to maintain security in 
Kabul, and to provide logistical, communications, and other support for the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. OEF is believed to have ultimately been 
responsible for the killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011. 
ISAF was the second multilateral military force that was established to address the Afghan 
security threat. ISAF was established in December 2001 as part of the Bonn Agreement, a 
meeting arranged between UN officials, Afghan political leaders, and members of the 
international community to discuss the future of post-Taliban Afghanistan. The UNSC 
authorised the establishment of ISAF in resolution 1386 and provided it with a mandate to 
support the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) to maintain security in and around Kabul.
37
 
ISAF operated under the command of NATO and was comprised of approximately 50 
countries, including those from the Middle East, Asia, and the Pacific region. Despite being 
sanctioned by the UNSC, ISAF was not organised, staffed, or funded by the UN. ISAF 
members provide their own equipment and personnel, and fund their own involvement in the 
force. For reasons of effectiveness, ISAF and OEF operate separately and have missions that 
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are distinct from each other.
38
 ISAF’s primary purpose is to assist in maintaining security in 
Afghanistan and creating the conditions whereby the new government of Afghanistan can 
exercise its authority throughout the country.
39
 
When the ATA was installed in Kabul at the end of 2001, the international military presence 
in Afghanistan was deliberately light. The US in particular was wary of repeating the Soviet 
mistakes of the 1980s by giving the impression the international military presence was an 
occupying force.
40
 ISAF had around 4,500 troops stationed in Kabul, while OEF had an even 
smaller number in the south-eastern provinces towards Pakistan pursuing missions against al-
Qaeda. The military strategy of the international forces came to be known as the ‘Afghan 
model’: a minimalist strategy based on air power, US Special Operations Forces, and 
indigenous troops. This strategy proved to be highly effective in removing the Taliban from 
power.
41
 But the strategy was much less effective in hunting down al-Qaeda and the Taliban 
forces who had escaped to the mountainous border region with Pakistan. One of the primary 
reasons for the ineffectiveness of this strategy was the lack of organisation and collaboration 
between the international forces and the indigenous Afghan troops.
42
 For security reasons, US 
military leaders did not inform their Afghan counterparts in advance of an operation which 
left them with little time to prepare for missions and hampered the effectiveness of the 
military elements in Afghanistan. There was not even a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 
with Afghanistan as is customary between sovereign states working together in a military 
situation. The increasingly limited effectiveness of the international military operations in 
2002 led the US and ISAF to conclude that maintaining the military pressure on the Taliban 
and al-Qaeda was going to require a revised military strategy.
43
 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
To be more effective, Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the UN wanted ISAF to expand its 
operations into the Afghan provinces. But this strategy called for a much greater number of 
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international troops. In Bosnia and Kosovo, there were initially 18 to 20 international 
peacekeepers per thousand people; to achieve this ratio in Afghanistan would have required 
hundreds of thousands of troops in a country that had a historical aversion to foreign 
occupation.
44
 The US was unwilling to deploy such a large number of troops to maintain 
security in Afghanistan’s isolated provincial towns and believed that a traditional 
peacekeeping mission would be ineffective in Afghanistan.
45
 Instead, it established the 
concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to spread the “ISAF effect” without 
actually expanding ISAF itself. The PRTs were combined military/civilian units comprised of 
up to 100 soldiers, Afghan advisers, and representatives from civilian agencies, such as the 
US State Department and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). In 2003, 
28 PRTs were established to maintain security and oversee the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan’s provinces. 
The PRTs had three main areas of focus. The first was to improve tactical-level military 
coordination between foreign and local troops. The second was to build and strengthen 
relationships between the foreign forces and the provincial leaders and communities; this 
meant respecting local leadership structures and partnering with the local actors who played 
important roles in the rebuilding process of Afghanistan. Third, the PRTs were to build local 
capacity in the areas of security and good governance through training, mentoring, and 
monitoring programmes.
46
 In these areas the PRTs initially achieved some success. They 
played important roles in everything from election support to disarmament to mediating 
minor conflicts, and managed to build support outside Kabul for the international forces and 
the new Afghan government. But despite their modest successes the PRTs were always “a bit 
of a muddle”.47 Their very nature as multinational, multifunctional, civil-military units 
created confusion among potential local partners as to their exact role in Afghanistan. Their 
effectiveness was also undermined by a combination of inconsistent mission statements, 
unclear roles and responsibilities, ad hoc mission preparations, and under-resourcing. The 
PRTs remained in operation, but the general sense of confusion around the nature of their 
operations prevented them from having as great an effect as the US and ISAF had envisaged. 
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The Counterproductive Effect of a Heavy Military Presence 
From late 2003, the US rescinded its decision to maintain a light military presence in 
Afghanistan and the international military force was expanded significantly. By 2007 the 
international forces in Afghanistan had grown to almost 50,000 and the US was still seeking 
further expansion.
48
 The vast mass of foreign troops increasingly began to resemble an 
occupation force and at times behaved like one. They frequently searched villages without the 
permission of the tribal elders and demonstrated little respect for the local civilians and their 
culture.
49
 They detained Afghan terror suspects on military bases, and were frequently 
accused human rights violations, injurious cases of mistaken identity, and even the death of 
suspects while in custody.
50
 As their presence increased, the foreign troops began to create a 
sense of fear and antagonism within Afghanistan.  
The military build up alongside the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003 had the effect of 
exacerbating the military conflict in Afghanistan.
51
 Afghanistan developed into a second front 
for an intensifying war between international forces and militant Islam. Radical groups from 
around the Middle East began to flock to Afghanistan in support of al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban’s struggle against the ‘occupying infidels’ of the West. This counterproductive effect 
was linked to the limitations of what Astri Suhrke refers to as the ‘American model’ of 
warfare in Afghanistan.
52
 The ‘American model’, an overly aggressive military approach, 
was clearly not the best approach for dealing with insurgency in Afghanistan. It had 
limitations that could not be overcome by simply deploying more troops.
53
 The heavier 
military presence simply reinforced these limitations and served to undermine rather than 
support the stabilisation of Afghanistan. ISAF came to recognise this fact and at one point 
even stressed the importance of the ‘hearts and minds’ component of counter-insurgency 
warfare. Yet it never publicly acknowledged the obvious failings associated with a creating a 
heavy military presence in Afghanistan. 
Overall, the military dimension of the Afghan intervention suffered from a lack of coherent 
strategic understanding of the nature of the mission. Peter Dahl Thuelsen argues that the 
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operations of OEF and ISAF represented a mission “being implemented with a lack of 
civilian resources, holistic strategy, interagency coordination and lacking an appreciation of 
the context and importance of mission success”.54 Confusion around the aims of the military 
mission seemed to stem from the top of the command ladder, and this confusion resulted in 
key military tasks being undertaken on an ‘ad hoc’ basis rather than in a consistent strategic 
manner. It is perhaps for this reason that the international forces struggled to bring about an 
acceptable level of security in Afghanistan and why an exit strategy for the vast numbers of 
international troops deployed in Afghanistan remained so elusive. 
The Civilian and Humanitarian Elements of the Afghan Intervention 
To coordinate the civilian/humanitarian elements of the intervention, the United Nations 
established the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) in March 2002. 
UNAMA is a political mission directed and supported by the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations. Its primary task is to maintain a coherent international engagement 
in Afghanistan, particularly in the areas of humanitarian assistance and human rights 
protection.
55
 UNAMA’s mandate provides a framework for cooperation between the 
Government of Afghanistan, the UN, and the international community in laying the 
foundations for human wellbeing in Afghanistan. With an annual budget of US$240 million 
in 2010, the largest budget of any UN political mission in history, UNAMA was an 
impressively grandiose multilateral initiative. In 2011 it had more than 2,100 civilian staff 
spread between 18 regional offices across Afghanistan and liaison offices in Islamabad and 
Teheran.
56
  
UNAMA was responsible for the direction and oversight of all humanitarian relief and 
human rights activities in Afghanistan. It sought to ensure that all international humanitarian 
programmes were in line with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, which was 
specifically designed to enable Afghanistan to gradually reduce its dependence upon 
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international aid.
57
 UNAMA monitored all humanitarian activities in an attempt to ensure 
maximum accountability in the area of humanitarian assistance. Yet humanitarianism was not 
the sole area of concern for UNAMA.
58
 Its operations were comprised of both humanitarian 
and political affairs. The separate Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) that had existed since 1988 to focus exclusively on humanitarian issues was 
disbanded when the integrated UNAMA mission was launched in 2002. As a result, UNAMA 
was as concerned with implementing the institutional and political objectives of the Bonn 
Agreement as it was with ensuring the humanitarian wellbeing of Afghanistan’s civilian 
population.
59
 This confused organisational structure essentially incorporated all international 
humanitarian activities into an integrated political mission. 
The fusion of UNAMA’s political and humanitarian functions in Afghanistan severely 
diminished the capacity and effectiveness of the international community in the humanitarian 
space.
60
 This was largely owing to the fact that the international community mistakenly 
accepted the notion that Afghanistan was in a post-conflict situation, and that therefore the 
role of the international humanitarian regime was to support the new Afghan government. 
The result of this was that the capacity for responding to humanitarian need that had existed 
since the late 1980s and had represented the only form of the international community’s 
engagement in Afghanistan during the Taliban years was dismantled on the basis of an 
erroneous assumption that it was no longer needed.
61
 As such, there was no humanitarian 
consensus among the intervening states and an absence of any exclusive humanitarian space 
in Afghanistan. The humanitarian donor states, all of whom were also belligerents in the war 
in Afghanistan, were either unable or unwilling to recognise the need for a purely 
humanitarian response to the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan and to mobilise the necessary 
resources.
62
 As such, while the humanitarian crisis steadily worsened the international 
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humanitarian regime was not suitably equipped to address the crisis, even in Kabul where the 
international humanitarian agencies were based. 
Many observers saw this linkage of humanitarian action with the political and military 
agendas of the intervening states as a dangerous blurring of lines.
63
 The integration of 
humanitarian assistance into a political military agenda seriously compromised the claims to 
the principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence that had traditionally been so 
central in the humanitarian space.
64
 Humanitarian workers were perceived as being associated 
with the international coalition in the military conflict, and this had devastating consequences 
for the workers themselves and the civilians who were denied assistance because of this 
perception. In Afghanistan, the balance of priorities was heavily in favour of the political 
process. Within UNAMA the political agenda trumped humanitarianism, and this had 
negative consequences for the humanitarian mission.
65
 Antonio Donini argues that a more 
modest humanitarian approach, “closer in ambition and intent to classical, time-tested 
humanitarian principles” offered much more hope of saving lives than did the “increasingly 
politically-driven and militarised form of relief” that was pursued in Afghanistan.66 This view 
was shared at the time by various humanitarian NGOs and the UN’s Emergency Relief 
Coordinator. Yet it remained opposed by the UN’s political authorities in Afghanistan.67  
Five years after its integrated mission was first launched, UNAMA belatedly came to 
recognise the paramount need for a separate humanitarian unit in Afghanistan. In 2007 it re-
established a separate Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 
However, separating humanitarian affairs from the political mission was not a cure for all of 
the problems associated with the international humanitarian effort in Afghanistan. To start 
with, the support of the international humanitarian regime in Afghanistan was simply not 
great enough. The Afghan population viewed the humanitarian action of the international 
community as superficial, and therefore ineffective and unsustainable.
68
 This perception is 
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justified when Afghanistan is compared with recent humanitarian assistance programmes 
such as those in East Timor, Kosovo, or Bosnia. In these countries, the international 
community spent an average of $250 per person annually in humanitarian aid.
69
 If that 
average were applied in Afghanistan, the country would have received $5.5 billion in aid 
every year. Instead, it received less than a quarter of that amount. Similarly, while Iraq 
received $26 billion in reconstruction aid in 2003, Afghanistan received less than $1 billion.
70
 
Many Afghan civilians also saw the international aid effort as something that was alien and 
did not concern them because it never materially reached them. A large source of this 
problem was that international aid was chronically mismanaged and involved too many 
intermediaries who were open to corruption. The greatest level of humanitarian assistance 
went not to the most needy, but to those who were “well-connected with those in power” and 
to “the rich and powerful who are able to occupy key links in the chain of intermediaries.”71 
The poorest people and those living in rural areas were rarely the beneficiaries of 
international assistance. These kinds of operational failings severely undermined the 
effectiveness of the international humanitarian regime, which found little favour in 
Afghanistan. The ineffectiveness of the humanitarian category as a whole in Afghanistan was 
reflected by the fact that in a very short space of time, international humanitarian NGOs 
turned from heroes to villains in the eyes of the Afghan civilian population.
72
 
The Multilateral Nature of the Intervention of Afghanistan 
While the US spearheaded the Afghan mission, the international community demonstrated 
great commitment to the intervention in Afghanistan. In total, more than 60 countries 
contributed to the force. The multilateral nature of the intervention is highlighted by 
analysing the significant contributions that were made by some of the countries involved. The 
following section provides a snapshot of the support that the Afghan intervention received 
from the international community by examining the contributions of three countries in 
particular: Australia, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. The nature and the extent to which 
these countries were involved in Afghanistan varied significantly, but their respective 
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contributions highlight the high degree to which the international community was committed 
to the intervention.  
The Australian Contribution 
As previously mentioned, Australia was the first country to offer unequivocal, open-ended 
support to the United States following the September 11 attacks by invoking the ANZUS 
military treaty.
73
 Accordingly, Australia was also one of the first countries to contribute 
military troops to the international mission in Afghanistan. The first contingent of 
approximately 200 Special Air Service (SAS) troops was deployed in a combat role as part of 
OEF just days after the initial bombing campaign began in October 2001.
74
 In the months that 
followed, Australia further contributed navy frigates, long-range maritime aircraft, tanker 
aircraft, and FA-18 fighter jets to Afghanistan. Australia’s SAS troops were based in Uruzgan 
province and their primary purpose was to improve security in the region by targeting and 
engaging the Taliban network in and around the province. The initial military support 
provided by Australia remained operative until the end of 2002. It was around this period that 
the Australian government began to focus its military commitment on the invasion of Iraq; 
for this reason no Australian Defence Force units were deployed again to Afghanistan until 
2005.
75
 
By this point the focus of the international operations in Afghanistan was more balanced 
between combat and reconstruction activities. At the request of the Afghan Government and 
ISAF, Australia’s SAS troops were re-deployed in September 2005 and rotated again in May 
2007 to undertake similar counterinsurgency tasks similar to those the force had performed in 
2001-2002.
76
 In August 2006 Australia also deployed more than 850 defence personnel to 
Afghanistan as part of a Reconstruction Task Force working in the Uruzgan province.
77
 This 
force contributed to the PRT in Uruzgan, working alongside civilian personnel from other 
Australian government agencies, such as the Australian Agency for International 
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Development (AusAID) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. A large number of 
Australian troops also operated under the Mentoring Task Force, training the Afghan 
National Security Forces to assume responsibility for maintaining security in Uruzgan. At the 
height of its contribution, Australia had more than 1,550 troops in Afghanistan.
78
 As of 
November 2011, Australian troops remain in Afghanistan. However, the size of the force is 
gradually decreasing as the security situation in Afghanistan slowly improves. Overall, 
Australia has suffered 32 combat deaths in Afghanistan. 
In the civilian and humanitarian space Australia’s contribution was also relatively significant. 
In the decade from 2001, Australia committed more than $800 million in aid and 
reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan through the country’s official agency AusAID.79 
This assistance is delivered at the national and provincial levels in line with the wider 
development priorities of the Afghan Government’s Afghanistan National Development 
Strategy. AusAID has nine personnel in Afghanistan who engage with the Afghan 
Government and ISAF to provide advice on stabilisation and development projects. Particular 
areas of focus include improving the delivery of basic services to Afghan civilians and 
supporting vulnerable populations. In 2009, AusAID funded the establishment of the 
Development Assistance Facility for Afghanistan (DAFA). The purpose of DAFA is to build 
local capacity within four of Afghanistan’s Ministries: Agriculture, Health, Education, and 
Rural Rehabilitation and Development. To achieve this, DAFA delivered an assistance 
programme worth $35 million over three years from March 2009 to April 2012.
80
 In addition 
to this, a significant portion of Australia’s humanitarian assistance was provided through the 
World Bank-run Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund which contributes to major 
infrastructural development activities.  
The United Kingdom’s Contribution 
Along with the United States, the UK military were the first country to initiate military action 
against Afghanistan by way of the bombing campaign that began in October 2001. Royal Air 
Force aircraft provided reconnaissance and air-to-air refuelling capabilities in support of US 
bomber aircraft. UK troops were first deployed in November 2001 when 1,700 ground forces 
helped to infiltrate and destroy a number of Taliban bunkers and caves. UK ground forces 
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retained a constant presence in Afghanistan as ISAF began to expand beyond Kabul from 
2003; the UK led the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in the North.  
In May 2006 the UK deployed troops into the south of Afghanistan as part of the plan to 
extend ISAF’s presence in from the north and Kabul. The British government commissioned 
the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit to lead interagency planning for a strategic framework 
that encompassed both civilian and military activity in the Helmand province, the heartland 
of the Taliban insurgency in southern Afghanistan. This new framework incorporated the 
operations of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Department for International 
Development (DFID). The logic was that having a joint strategy would allow the military and 
civilian dimensions of the UK mission to collaborate in their efforts for greater operational 
effectiveness.
81
 The British campaign in Helmand began with a focus on hard military power 
and destroying the Taliban in the south. An initial 3,600 British troops were deployed to 
secure the region by spreading out and engaging with the Taliban from outposts throughout 
the province. However, this force was far too small to properly secure the area and they 
suffered large losses to the Taliban; in just five months, 29 British troops had been killed in 
the region.   
By 2007 the UK began to acknowledge its failings in Helmand and revised its military 
strategy. It concluded that the military campaign needed “more resources and less fighting”.82 
Along with the supply of superior military equipment, an additional 1,500 troops were 
deployed to Helmand in response to the Taliban’s fierce resistance. More importantly, 
however, the focus of the British mission evolved from one based on hard military offensives 
to a more conservative mission focusing on stabilisation operations to secure the civilian 
population.
83
 The British military concentrated its efforts on undermining the Taliban’s 
influence in the region rather than directly fighting their forces. This “population-centric” 
strategy proved to be much more successful. The British troops were more effectively able to 
protect urban centres and develop the Afghan government’s influence and authority in those 
areas that could realistically be secured and held.
84
 In 2009 Theo Farrell and Stuart Gordon 
concluded that the UK military machine, while “a little creaky perhaps...., is fit for purpose” 
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and was achieving success in Afghanistan. As of November 2011, the UK had suffered a total 
of 388 combat deaths, second highest only to the United States.  
The UK was also one of the major players in the civilian and humanitarian area. The UK’s 
Department for International Development (DFID) was the third largest donor of 
humanitarian and development assistance to Afghanistan, contributing an estimated 100 
million pounds per year from 2004.
85
 DFID’s assistance in Afghanistan unfolded in two 
distinct phases. The first was an essentially limited humanitarian effort from 2001-2003 that 
focused on providing basic humanitarian assistance to civilians during the initial military 
engagement. The purpose of this initial stage was simply to reduce the impact of the 
intervention as much as possible. During this period DFID had a comparatively good track 
record on aid effectiveness, with pledges being translated to meaningful disbursements 
reasonably quickly.
86
 The second phase was characterised by a series of programmes that 
moved away from purely humanitarian assistance and into areas such as state building, 
economic management, election monitoring, and anti-corruption. This shift in focus was 
consistent with the broader UNAMA policy of integrating humanitarian action into the 
international political mission in Afghanistan. The problems that hampered the international 
humanitarian effort as a result of this blurring of the lines between the humanitarian and the 
political agendas have already been discussed above. However, it is important to note that the 
UK’s broader development activities achieved some measure of success in important areas 
such as improving access to education and healthcare.
87
  
The Netherlands’ Contribution 
Like Australia and the UK, the Netherlands also contributed militarily to both OEF and ISAF 
missions in Afghanistan from an early stage. In early 2002 Dutch Special Forces troops were 
deployed; in 2003, the Netherlands headed ISAF along with Germany; in 2004 a Dutch 
Apache helicopter unit was deployed; and in 2005 F16 fighter plane units served in 
Afghanistan. In December 2005, despite considerable domestic opposition, the Netherlands 
made its first combat deployment of ground troops since the Korean War when it contributed 
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approximately 2,000 troops to ISAF.
88
 Despite this significant military contribution, the 
Dutch military strategy was based on avoiding military combat wherever possible.
89
 The 
Dutch motto was “Rebuild Where Possible, Fight Where Necessary”, and Dutch forces 
operated under a mandate that typically required them to use force only if attacked. They 
were to avoid enemy engagement rather than pursue it. The strategy became known as the 
“3D” strategy because its focus was on defence, development, and diplomacy rather than 
traditional military offensives.  
Employing this strategy allowed the Netherlands to avoid large numbers of troop losses. It 
also managed to keep civilian deaths and physical destruction of property relatively low; the 
Netherlands even went so far as to establish a compensation system for local property that 
was damaged by Dutch troops.
90
 The minimalist military strategy of the Dutch was seen by 
some as being politically motivated to keep casualties low in order to prevent domestic 
dissent at the country’s contribution to Afghanistan.91 If this was the case, it appeared to be 
effective. The Dutch forces were initially scheduled to withdraw by the end of 2008, but this 
was extended to August 2010 by the new Dutch coalition government in November 2007. 
Despite their prolonged presence in Afghanistan, critics argued that the Dutch troops spent 
too much time in secured areas rather than fighting to secure new areas. They therefore failed 
to offer any significant challenge to the Taliban’s control over the regions in which Dutch 
reconstruction efforts were taking place. In August 2010, the Netherlands became the first 
NATO country to withdraw its entire military contingent from Afghanistan. Overall, the 
country suffered a total of 25 combat deaths.  
In the humanitarian space, the support of the Netherlands was more overt. After the 
overthrow of the Taliban, the Netherlands placed Afghanistan on its list of partner countries 
which guaranteed a long-term aid relationship between the two countries.
92
 The focus of this 
relationship was initially on emergency humanitarian aid to help provide the basic needs 
required by the Afghan civilians. Beyond this initial period the focus shifted towards 
sustainable development through the provision of assistance to help with the reconstruction 
                                                 
88
 John Nagal and Richard Weitz, 'Counterinsurgency and the Future of NATO', The Chicago Council on Global 
Affairs, Transatlantic Paper Series No. 1 (2010). p.12. 
89
 Ibid. p.12-13. 
90
 Ibid. p.14. 
91
 Ibid. p.14. 
92
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Netherlands) (2006), 'The Netherlands in Afghanistan', 
http://netherlandsmission.org/files/pdf/the-netherlands-in-afghanistan.pdf. accessed 02 October 2012. 
  
48 
 
effort in Afghanistan. According to the Dutch government, the reconstruction effort in 
Afghanistan would only be effective if development, humanitarian, and economic aid play as 
great a role as the military dimensions of the mission.
93
 It argued that human prosperity and 
greater individual rights would be as effective as military action in preventing further conflict 
in Afghanistan. This sentiment was reflected in the main principle underpinning the Dutch 
contribution in the humanitarian and civilian space: “as military as necessary, as civilian as 
possible”.94 Fittingly, The Netherlands was appointed by ISAF and the Afghan government 
as the lead country in the area of good governance. 
  
When the US-led coalition intervened in Afghanistan in October 2001, it did so with the 
overwhelming support of the international community. A number of countries made 
substantial contributions of military personnel and equipment, civilian reconstruction units, 
humanitarian personnel and supplies, and financial aid in what was a truly multilateral 
mission; this chapter explored the contributions of Australia, the UK, and the Netherlands in 
particular. Yet the basis for this support varied among those countries involved. Some 
emphasised the security rationale for intervention and the importance of taking action against 
international terrorism, while others stressed the centrality of the humanitarian rationale and 
the importance of improving the lives of Afghanistan’s suffering civilian population. The 
degree to which these two rationales featured in their justifications for contributing to the 
intervention differed from country to country. This highlights the fact that the two primary 
rationales for intervention in Afghanistan were mutually reinforcing and frequently 
overlapped. The security and humanitarian rationales were both key elements of the 
intervention and were pivotal in garnering international support. The centrality of both 
rationales to the intervention therefore cannot be overlooked. 
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CHAPTER 4: AFGHANISTAN’S REFUGEE CRISIS 
 
After being caught in the grip of conflict and strife for more than two decades, the 
international intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 was just the latest episode in a series of 
tragic events for Afghanistan’s civilian population. For Afghans, this period was 
characterised by wave after wave of forced displacement. It is estimated that during the 
course of the 1980s and 1990s, as many as two in every three Afghans had been displaced at 
some point, some more than once. In spite of the coalition’s claim that the intervention would 
provide some respite to the suffering endured by the Afghan population, in reality it 
exacerbated the situation. It created yet another vast wave of displacement as millions of 
Afghans fled from the latest state of conflict to engulf their country. Following the overthrow 
of the Taliban, the international community tried to reconstruct Afghanistan through various 
methods of state building; it was envisaged that the country would be in an adequate position 
to welcome back the millions of refugees that had sought refuge from the conflict in 
neighbouring Pakistan and Iran. However, Afghanistan remained plagued by ongoing conflict 
and sat rooted to the bottom of the UN Human Development Index. The new Afghan state 
was in no position to facilitate the repatriation of its vast refugee population. 
The History of Afghanistan’s Refugees 
More than two decades of persistent tragedy resulted in a refugee crisis in Afghanistan that, at 
its height, accounted for roughly 60 per cent of the entire world refugee population. The roots 
of the refugee crisis were sewn as early as 1978 and the PDPA’s seizure of power detailed in 
chapter two of this thesis. Small numbers of refugees displaced by the internal political 
conflict began to trickle into the neighbouring states of Pakistan and Iran. In December 1979 
the trickle became a flood as millions of Afghans sought refuge from the intense 
bombardments of the Soviet Union. The majority of refugees fled from mostly rural areas 
where the fighting between the Soviet forces and the mujahideen took place. Because the 
country had been invaded by a non-Islamic power, flight was not only seen by the Afghan 
population as a means of escaping from war and violence, but also as a religious duty.
1
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By the beginning of 1981, the outflow of refugees to Pakistan and Iran was already estimated 
to have numbered 2.3 and 1.5 million respectively.
2
 In Pakistan, refugee camps were 
established along the length of the border with Afghanistan with assistance from the 
international community and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) which 
provided food rations, tents, and other basic necessities. As their numbers increased 
throughout the 1980s, refugees began to build their own mud houses and gradually these 
refugee camps were transformed into more permanent ‘refugee villages’.3 While the Pakistani 
government allowed Afghan refugees to move freely around the country and gain 
employment, it restricted the rights of refugees to own land in Pakistan which meant that 
many refugees had little choice but to remain in the ‘refugee villages’ on the border. By 1990 
there were said to be more than 300 ‘refugee villages’ in Pakistan that served as a home to 
more than 3.3 million Afghan refugees. 
Meanwhile, in Iran the 1979 revolution had put an Islamic fundamentalist government in 
power. This severely strained its relationship with the West. As a result, Iran was initially 
reluctant to seek international assistance in order to deal with the vast number of Afghan 
refugees that poured across its border. When Iran did request international assistance in 1980, 
it received a small fraction of the assistance that was afforded to Pakistan.
4
 In spite of this the 
Iranian government established a limited number of refugee camps along its border with 
Afghanistan and provided refugees with access to free education, healthcare, and to subsidies 
on basic necessities. It also allowed refugees to work legally in designated menial 
occupations.
5
 Generally speaking, this enabled refugees in Iran to be much more independent 
and live better lives than those in Pakistan. By 1990 there were an estimated three million 
Afghan refugees in Iran, making the total number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran the 
largest refugee population in the world at more than six million. 
Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, millions of refugees in Pakistan and Iran 
began to return. The UNHCR established assisted repatriation programmes in both countries 
to encourage refugees to return to Afghanistan. In Pakistan, refugees who cancelled their 
refugee passbooks and returned to Afghanistan were given a cash grant of US $100 to cover 
the cost of travel, and 300kg of wheat. According to David Turton and Peter Marsden, this 
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programme was about “de-registration as much as it was about repatriation” because the 
donor states of the west were eager to reduce their assistance to Afghanistan’s refugees now 
that the Cold War was over.
6
 By 1992 the programme had facilitated the return of more than 
900,000 refugees from Pakistan and was trumpeted as a success. A similarly successful 
repatriation programme was run from Iran, where the government had signed a three year 
repatriation agreement with the new Afghan government and the UNHCR. By 1993 more 
than 600,000 Afghan refugees returned to Afghanistan from Iran. 
However, no sooner had this estimated 1.5 million refugees returned to Afghanistan than the 
country once again descended into disorder. As detailed in chapter two, internal ethnic 
divisions within the mujahideen began to fight over control of the government in Kabul. In 
1994, an intense civil war broke out in Afghanistan that would last until September 2000. For 
the Afghan population, the widespread violence and destruction that accompanied the civil 
war resulted in waves of force displacement, or re-displacement for those who had recently 
repatriated. An estimated 65,000 refugees fled to Pakistan and Iran from Kabul and other 
parts of Afghanistan in 1994. Tens of thousands more fled from Herat in 1995, Jalalabad in 
1996, Mazar-i-Sherif in 1998, and Taloqan in 2000. It was estimated that in 2000 alone, more 
than 170,000 Afghans sought refuge in Pakistan from the deadly cocktail of civil war, 
Taliban brutality, and famine and drought. On the 10
th
 of September 2001, the UNHCR 
estimated that the total number of Afghan refugees in the world stood at 4.65 million. Of this 
number, 3.7 million resided in states that neighboured Afghanistan, while almost one million 
more remained internally displaced.
7
 
The Impact of the 2001 Intervention on Afghanistan’s Refugee Crisis 
With international military intervention imminent in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, yet another wave of refugee mobilisation took place in Afghanistan. By the time the 
US began its bombing campaign on the night of October 7
th
, vast numbers of Afghans had 
already began abandoning cities and towns that could become military targets. The mass 
exodus was so swift that the UNHCR expressed its concern that hundreds of thousands of 
Afghans attempting to hastily escape the country were under threat from the more than 10 
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million landmines and other unexploded ordnance that remained dispersed in rural areas from 
the Soviet war.
8
 It is estimated that between October 2001 and January 2002, 200,000 Afghan 
refugees made their way to Pakistan in order to escape the US bombing, while a further 1.2 
million were internally displaced.
9
  
The mass exodus of Afghans from their homelands was justified in the context of the 
consequences that the international intervention had upon the lives of the Afghan population. 
The US bombing ruined much of the country’s remaining infrastructure, while approximately 
fifty percent of the houses in the major Afghan cities were destroyed or damaged.
10
 Human 
Rights Watch interviewed dozens of refugees who fled to Pakistan during the early months of 
the international intervention and reported that the most common reasons for fleeing 
Afghanistan were related to the physical and psychological harm caused by the US bombing. 
The Taliban intentionally set up its military bases near to civilian settlements in an attempt to 
shield itself from the bombing. The local population naturally felt increasingly insecure when 
these bases were being bombed anyway, regardless of their proximity to their homes. One 
refugee explained how “each night the electricity went off and then the bombs came and our 
children would scream and cry. We just could not stay there anymore with this hell every 
night.”11 
The large number of Afghans who fled their country was further justified in doing so by the 
number of civilian deaths that were reported during the initial months of the intervention. In a 
study of the nine month period between September 2001 and June 2002, Aldo Benini and 
Lawrence Moulton found that a total of 5,576 Afghan civilians were killed by coalition 
forces.
12
 This figure was largely a consequence of the bombing campaign. A number of 
villages were bombed due to mistaken information, including one on October 10
th
 2001 near 
Jalalabad which was reduced to rubble after a US bombing raid; on October 11
th
 the US 
admitted that the village had been hit by mistake.
13
 Eyewitnesses claimed to have seen 30 
fresh graves in the village the day after the raid, while the Taliban claim the death toll was 
more than 200. According to media reports, the US and UK warplanes also continued to drop 
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cluster bombs despite such weapons being strongly condemned by several humanitarian 
groups because of the massive indiscriminate destruction they cause.
14
 Even after the 
bombing campaign, the war continued to claim high numbers of civilian casualties as 
coalition forces began to round up al-Qaeda remnants in the Afghan cities. Angered by the 
seemingly indiscriminate manner in which the coalition launched its military offensive in 
Afghanistan, thousands of protestors turned out in frequent anti-US demonstrations in various 
cities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
15
 
To add to the suffering that was endured by the Afghan population, the intervention also 
hampered the mechanisms that existed for redressing the pre-existing suffering in 
Afghanistan. The UN World Food Programme had warned early in 2001 that more than 1 
million Afghans were facing famine conditions, with millions dependent on international 
food aid for survival.
16
 But the intervention exacerbated this desperate humanitarian situation 
further by causing a massive disruption in the international humanitarian aid operations in 
Afghanistan. As the security environment in the country rapidly deteriorated, the majority of 
international aid workers were forcibly withdrawn from Afghanistan.
17
 The United Nations 
massively reduced all aid operations in Afghanistan, while Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) 
withdrew all expatriate staff from all but three locations in the north. Dealing with the 
world’s worst humanitarian disaster was left to the skeleton staff of local UN employees that 
remained in Afghanistan.  
The ground delivery of aid supplies from outside Afghanistan was also severely hampered by 
the intervention. The World Food Programme (WFP) had resumed the delivery of food 
supplies into Afghanistan despite the continuation of the US bombing campaign. But 
suppliers and aid workers faced regular interruption from the bombing raids and troops 
movements.
18
 The disruption limited the WFP’s delivery of wheat stocks to just 14,800 
tonnes during the month of October; an estimated 60,000 tonnes were required in order to 
feed the 7.5 million Afghans dependent upon food aid over the winter. Furthermore, the 
intervention hampered the ability of humanitarian agencies to reach those in need. Head of 
the Red Cross in Kabul, Reto Stocker, claimed that aid agencies had “never had so little 
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access” to those in need at any time over the past 27 years. He explained that while 
“prolonged human suffering is causing real concern in ever larger areas... there is little 
capacity to address it”.19 With the coalition focusing its efforts primarily on security and 
developmental aid, Stocker warned that large humanitarian needs were being overlooked in 
Afghanistan. The result of this was that the prospects for obtaining basic food aid, shelter, 
and medical care became even bleaker for the vast number of Afghans in need. The 
humanitarian situation grew so severe that the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (UNCHR) warned that the Afghan crisis could turn into “a humanitarian 
disaster on the same scale” as was seen in Rwanda’s crisis of 1994 where nearly 800,000 
people were killed or died from disease and malnutrition.
20
  
The Bush administration acknowledged the concern around the negative impact that the 
intervention was having upon the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan. It responded by 
announcing that it was providing a US $320 million food air drop campaign to assist those in 
need. But this initiative prompted widespread criticism from international aid agencies 
including MSF and Oxfam, who view air drops as a last-resort tactic for delivering 
humanitarian relief to isolated areas.
21
 Food drops are expensive than other methods of food 
distribution and are usually less targeted to those in the greatest need. Large amounts of food 
will also often become unusable because it either gets lost or the packaging breaks on impact. 
In a country with 750 square kilometres of uncharted minefield, food that is dropped into 
these zones may endanger the lives of desperate people who attempt to retrieve the aid.
22
 In 
any case, the American food drops did little to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in 
Afghanistan; as Oxfam spokesperson, Sam Barratt, explained, “dropping 37,500 meals per 
night in a country where 5.5 million people are starving is a drop in the ocean”.23  
Relief agencies in the ground in Afghanistan dismissed the US food air drop campaign as 
little more than a means of scoring political points.
24
 While the American food drops in 
Afghanistan are hardly the first example of politicized humanitarian aid, Emery and Ruiz 
highlight the extent to which the humanitarian and the military goals of the US were linked 
by pointing out how questions about the food drops were fielded by Defence Secretary 
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Donald Rumsfeld at Pentagon briefings.
25
 Yet by associating humanitarian aid with military 
operations, the US posed a potentially serious threat to the lives of many ‘genuine’ aid 
workers in Afghanistan by creating a sense of confusion in the minds of the Afghan 
population over the nature of international humanitarian aid.
26
 The air drop campaign was a 
case of “shooting with one hand and distributing aid with the other”. While it made little 
contribution to the humanitarian situation, it severely undermined the work of humanitarian 
agencies in Afghanistan by placing their image as impartial groups in disrepute. These 
agencies were adamant that the only way to ease the humanitarian catastrophe was to 
immediately suspend the US bombing in order to allow for the ground delivery of aid to those 
in need.
27
 
The intervention also served to intensify the refugee crisis in Afghanistan by exacerbating the 
tensions that existed between Afghanistan and its neighbours on the issue of refugees. The 
intervention further tested the wilting resolve of Afghanistan’s neighbours to accommodate 
the masses of fleeing Afghans by creating yet another wave of refugees. Hostility and 
intolerance towards Afghan refugees had been growing in Pakistan and Iran long before the 
events of September 11.
28
 From the late 1990s, the governments of both countries made it 
clear that Afghan refugees were no longer welcome in their countries. In 1997, the Iranian 
government refused to register new arrivals from Afghanistan, while police began to 
randomly question Afghans in the street as to the validity of their residence in Iran. In 
periodic waves, both those who had documentation and those who did not were taken to 
detention centres and deported back to Afghanistan.
29
 The Pakistani government similarly 
hardened its attitude towards Afghan refugees and officially closed its border with 
Afghanistan in 2000. It cited a lack of international support as the primary reason for this, 
with one Pakistani official claiming that “if donors have donor fatigue, then we have asylum 
fatigue”.30 The hard-line policies towards Afghan refugees in both Pakistan and Iran were a 
natural consequence of the international community’s unwillingness to support Afghanistan’s 
neighbours to address the refugee crisis. Both countries perceived the deepening Afghan 
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refugee problem as a case of the richest states in the world shifting the burden of refugee 
assistance onto the shoulders of the poorest.
31
  
In response to these hard-line policies against Afghan refugees, the international community 
did increase its financial assistance to Pakistan and Iran in late 2001 to help the two countries 
better manage the latest influx of Afghan refugees. But this was not enough to convince 
Pakistan and Iran to open their borders to Afghanistan or to provide legal protection to 
Afghan refugees. Both countries continued to enact policies that infringed upon the rights of 
Afghanistan’s refugees.32 Iran agreed to build camps on its border to accommodate the new 
influx of refugees, but the UNHCR reported in November 2001 that Iran was continuing to 
deport Afghan refugees that had crossed the border since the intervention began.
33
 At one 
point more than 350 refugees were forcibly returned to Afghanistan in a matter of days. 
Pakistan also agreed to accept Afghan refugees under a new ‘relocation’ initiative that 
involved relocating Afghan refugees to areas of the country far away from the Afghan border. 
Yet Human Rights Watch reported that the forced return of Afghan refugees continued to 
take place in Pakistan towards the end of 2001, at a rate of approximately 300 per month in 
October and November.
34
 In some cases, refugee parents were being picked up in the street 
and deported, with their children left behind in Pakistan.
35
 The influx of refugees that 
accompanied the 2001 intervention proved to be the straw that broke the back of 
Afghanistan’s neighbours. The result was that, in direct violation of international refugee law, 
Afghan refugees were being forcibly returned to a situation where they were lives were under 
a very real threat. 
International State-Building in Afghanistan 
For the intervening coalition, the permanent solution to the refugee crisis in Afghanistan lay 
in the country’s reconstruction. International reconstruction, or state-building, is the common 
response by the international community when a state fails. Over the past two decades, state-
building projects have taken place in the wake of conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, 
and more recently Iraq and Afghanistan. While there is no universally accepted model for 
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rebuilding a failed state, state-building is usually characterised by measures such as ending 
conflict between warring parties, establishing a UN-provided interim authority, creating a 
new democratic government, constructing multi-ethnic national institutions, returning 
refugees in exile, and ultimately rebuilding the infrastructure and economy.
36
 The state-
building process that took place in Afghanistan followed this model to a large extent.  
Following the launch of the intervention, Afghanistan could accurately have been described 
as a “quasi-state”. Despite being recognised as a state by the international community it 
lacked the effective power and authority to protect the rights and provide for the social and 
economic welfare of its citizens.
37
 The process to reconstruct the Afghan state began almost 
immediately after the fall of the Taliban. The UN organised a conference in Bonn, Germany, 
to map out the future of Afghanistan. Attendance at the Bonn Conference was made up of the 
major western powers, Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries, and political representatives 
from the major ethnic groups in Afghanistan. It was decided that the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan should not be performed by outsiders. Rather, the international efforts on 
Afghanistan should be directed towards building the capacity of the Afghan government and 
empowering Afghan citizens to assume control of their own state.
38
 In this context it was 
further decided that political control should be transferred back to the local authorities as 
soon as possible, rather than being placed under UN control as had been the case in Kosovo 
and Bosnia. An Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) would hold political control from December 
2001 before the Afghanistan Transitional Authority (ATA) under the leadership of American-
backed Hamid Karzai would assume control from June 2002. The Bonn Agreement stipulated 
that the ATA would be responsible for overseeing the reconstruction of Afghanistan until a 
suitable point in 2004 when democratic elections would be held.
39
 From this point onwards 
the newly elected government of Afghanistan would take on the responsibility for the 
country’s reconstruction, though at no point would the support of the international 
community be prematurely withdrawn. In September 2004 Karzai won the Presidential 
election largely through securing the support of his Pashtun majority ethnic base, while 
parliamentary elections were not held until September 2005. 
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The Place of Refugee Repatriation in State-Building 
Refugee repatriation is central to the state-building process. Over the past two decades 
refugee issues have often been both a cause and consequence of political conflict. Finding 
permanent solutions to the needs of refugees has therefore been a focal point of international 
state-building initiatives. Meeting the basic needs of returnees and reintegrating them into 
society is often the first objective of a transitional state.
40
 In principle, refugee repatriation 
can only take place once significant changes have taken place within the country of origin to 
ensure that the original reason for flight has been addressed. Because the nature of the state is 
often central to the refugees’ plight, it is often the fundamental make-up of the state itself that 
needs to be addressed in this context.
41
  
There are a number of reasons why refugee repatriation is perceived as being so important in 
the state-building process. First and foremost, refugees provide a transitional state with the 
legitimacy it requires to fit within the international community.
42
 In the eyes of the 
international community, states that generate refugee flows lack the legitimacy of their 
citizens because there has been a breakdown in the state-citizen relationship. When refugees 
decide to return to their home countries, they are re-placing their faith in their state to protect 
them. This is seen as an important show of support for the transitional state by its citizens. On 
the return of refugees to Afghanistan, a UNHCR official commented that “Afghans are 
showing the world how confident they are about the future of their country”.43 
Returning refugees are also seen as an important human resource for states in transition. This 
was recognised in the UN’s transitional plan for Afghanistan when it expressed that “the 
return of millions of uprooted people will be an important achievement with the dual benefit 
of providing human resources for reconstruction as well as rebuilding civil society”.44 
Because they are returning to countries that have had experienced a high level of destruction, 
refugees must work hard to rebuild their lives from the moment of their return. The 
aggregated result of this hard work is highly beneficial for the state, and returning refugees 
have often been integrated into the development objectives of transitional states.
45
 Returnees 
are often able to find employment within international agencies that are involved in the 
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reconstruction project. This serves a double purpose in that it not only provides much needed 
employment for returnees, but it also gives them a sense of ownership in the renewal of the 
country which can, in turn, assist in their successful reintegration. The value of refugees as a 
human resource  
However, for all of the benefits associated with refugee return, large-scale repatriation can 
also have an adverse effect on state development and run against the best interests of refugees 
themselves. For states in transition, managing the successful repatriation of masses of 
refugees is an imposing challenge, particularly as many refugees return spontaneously 
without assistance; in Afghanistan, for example, more than 150,000 refugees had returned 
before the UNHCR even began its repatriation programme. Yet it is essential that states 
manage the repatriation of refugees in a manner that is consistent with their reconstruction 
initiatives.
46
 If the state is not suitably equipped to provide refugees with the basic needs and 
services that they require to successfully reintegrate, refugee repatriation can result in 
unsuccessful reintegration experiences and re-displacement. For Turton and Marsden, this 
poses a strange paradox in that states in post-conflict transition are “almost by definition, 
unable to provide the kind of stability and security, the lack of which induced their citizens to 
become refugees in the first place”.47 In this sense repatriation can only be considered a 
sustainable solution to forced displacement if the state in question is capable of successfully 
facilitating the reintegration of refugees. 
The Suitability of Afghanistan for Refugee Repatriation 
The following section explores the extent to which Afghanistan was in a position capable of 
facilitating the repatriation of refugees from Iran and Pakistan in 2002. By mid-2002, the 
intervening coalition had successfully removed the Taliban from power and installed the 
ATA to oversee the reconstruction of the country. Yet at this stage the level of security and 
human wellbeing in Afghanistan remained among the worst in the world and Afghanistan 
remained rooted near the bottom of the UN Human Development Index.
48
 The international 
state-building efforts had begun, yet they could not accurately be described as ‘post-conflict’ 
reconstruction because the conflict between international forces and the Taliban and al-Qaeda 
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was still ongoing. There was certainly no peace agreement or reconciliation between the 
warring parties that usually characterises the start of state-building activities.
49
 Even the most 
basic efforts to assist the Afghan population were complicated by the intense fighting that 
continued between the two sides. 
A number of other factors also contributed to the insecure environment in Afghanistan. After 
so many years of conflict and disorder within Afghanistan a general culture of impunity had 
developed towards human rights. Reports of human rights violations were widespread 
throughout Afghanistan while the perpetrators were rarely brought to justice for their crimes. 
The more than 10 million mines and other unexploded ordnance left scattered throughout the 
Afghan countryside posed a significant threat to many Afghans just performing their 
everyday tasks. The Afghan Human Development Report estimated that in 2004, between 
150 and 300 people were killed or injured by explosive devices every month, many of them 
children.
50
 With growing populations, high unemployment, and inadequate policing in 
Afghanistan’s major cities, the urban crime rate was at record highs and increasing.51 These 
precarious security conditions made for a very difficult living environment for the refugees 
who hoped to return and reconstruct their lives. Their ability to recreate stable and sustainable 
lives in Afghanistan was impeded by the fact that the majority of Afghans were unable to 
simply maintain a basic standard of physical safety. 
While the state is supposed to be the primary source of support for returning refugees, the 
disorderly political environment in Afghanistan posed a further obstacle to successful 
reintegration. The new Afghan government was in no position to provide returnees with the 
essential services they required because it was consumed with trying to hold a monopoly on 
political power in Afghanistan. In spite of the effort that the international coalition had put 
into regenerating the Afghan National Army, the new Afghan government struggle to assert 
its authority throughout the country.
52
 In fact, for years after the intervention the authority of 
Karzai’s government extended only weakly beyond the outskirts of Kabul. Its inherent 
weakness limited the government’s ability to bring about positive change in a timely manner 
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and deliver on its promised improved security targets, or even a semblance of the rule of law. 
As time passed, these governmental failings resulted in an increasing sense of disillusionment 
and distrust among Afghans towards Karzai’s government.53 
As a result of the government’s lack of authority and control beyond Kabul, local governance 
of Afghanistan’s provinces was entrusted to regional warlords or militia groups that were 
loosely affiliated with the government. Rather than dedicating resources to removing them 
from power, the Afghan government and the international coalition decided to maintain 
relationships with local warlords. However, because these local authorities often had their 
own established rules for the provision of welfare and security, they undermined the 
coalition’s efforts to strengthen central authority and the rule of law in Afghanistan. Many of 
the regional warlords had human rights records that rival that of the Taliban; some even 
continued to work in mutually-beneficial relationships with the Taliban and al-Qaeda 
forces.
54
 The populations under the control of these local rulers were frequently subjected to 
acts of intimidation and human rights abuse. A 2002 Human Rights Watch report described 
Afghanistan as “a fractured, undemocratic collection of ‘fiefdoms’ in which warlords are free 
to intimidate, extort, and repress local populations”.55 Many Afghans had held high 
expectations that Karzai’s government would take the unique opportunity that Afghanistan 
had for reform and completely restructure the country’s political system.56 However, for 
many Afghans the new political structure remained almost identical to that which existed 
prior to the intervention; as one Herat resident remonstrated, “What has changed in 
Afghanistan? Look: all the same warlords are in power as before”.57 
The social condition of many Afghans also failed to register any meaningful improvement 
following the intervention. The Afghan Human Development Report of 2004 described the 
magnitude of poverty in Afghanistan as “unacceptably high”.58 The Afghan Independent 
Human Rights Commission estimated that more than two-thirds of the population had no 
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stable source of income and lived below the poverty line, earning less than $1USD per day.
59
 
As a consequence, a large proportion of the population lacked access to basic necessities. 
Food insecurity was manifested by extreme malnutrition while a lack of shelter, clothing, safe 
water, and sanitation facilities were also common. In the absence of an adequate health care 
system, these social conditions contributed to a major health crisis in Afghanistan. Average 
life expectancy in 2004 stood at a meagre 45 years for males and 44 years for females, while 
infant and maternal mortality rates in Afghanistan were also among the highest in the 
world.
60
  
The state of Afghanistan’s education system also placed it among the worst in the world. The 
more than two decades of conflict in Afghanistan had damaged or destroyed an estimated 80 
percent of the country’s schools, resulting in a large shortage of schooling facilities. While 
this shortage of facilities was the primary obstacle to gaining an education for Afghan 
children, family commitments and marriage for girls, and the need for employment for boys 
are also common obstacles.
61
 Those children that were able to attend school regularly had to 
endure open-air facilities or tents with little or no furniture or learning materials. Decades of 
insufficient education in Afghanistan was reflected in the fact that, in 2004, the adult literacy 
rate stood at a mere 28 percent of adults over 15 years of age.
62
 
 
For many Afghans, not only did the intervention in October 2001 fail to provide any relief 
from their suffering, it exacerbated the arduous security and humanitarian environment in 
Afghanistan even further. Millions were forcibly displaced as the war between the 
international coalition and the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces caused further destruction to an 
already devastated country. In spite of the coalition’s efforts to reconstruct Afghanistan 
following the fall of the Taliban, the country remained firmly entrenched in the depths of 
humanitarian despair. While ongoing fighting continued to endanger the lives of civilians, the 
weak and disorderly Afghan government failed to deliver any significant improvements to the 
living conditions of the Afghan population. Many of Afghanistan’s human development 
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indicators remained as low as they had been prior to the intervention. In this state, 
Afghanistan was in no position to facilitate the repatriation of millions of refugees from 
Pakistan and Iran in early 2002.
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CHAPTER 5: THE UNHCR IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
Despite the fact that Afghanistan remained in such a destitute state in early 2002, the 
UNHCR chose to pursue a policy of repatriation in response to the refugee crisis. It 
maintained that repatriation was the ‘durable solution’ that would finally allow the millions 
of Afghan refugees living abroad to rebuild their lives in dignity and peace in Afghanistan. 
With the support of the UNHCR and encouraged by the international coalition and the new 
Afghan government, a record number of refugees returned to Afghanistan under the 
UNHCR’s repatriation programme. The programme was subsequently hailed as an 
overwhelming success. However, in the weeks and months that followed the mass 
repatriation it became clear that in fact repatriation was not a durable solution at all to the 
Afghan refugee crisis. The desperate state of the country hampered any attempt to create a 
sustainable livelihood for those who had returned and many returnees were almost 
immediately re-displaced. The repatriation of millions of refugees in 2002 was highly 
premature and ran firmly against the best interests of the refugees themselves. The 
fundamental question that is raised here is: why therefore did the UNHCR choose repatriation 
as its preferred policy in response to the Afghan refugee crisis? 
The Mandate of the UNHCR 
The UNHCR is the main international organisation responsible for providing political and 
legal protection to refugees. The agency was formally established after WWII in response to 
the masses of displaced and stateless people in Europe who required assistance in the 
aftermath of the war. Its primary purpose was and remains to compliment the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and Articles I, 55, and 56 of the UN Charter, 
which provide the legal grounds for the protection of refugees.
1
 Since its inception in 1951 
the UNHCR has grown substantially in terms of its budget and staff, and its mandate is now 
global. This expansion was necessitated by the need for a better response to increasingly 
complex and challenging refugee crises around the world. It was also the result of the 
agency’s drive for institutional ascendancy in the humanitarian domain.2 While it is necessary 
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for the UNHCR to work closely with states in response to refugee crises, its mandate remains 
non-political and strictly humanitarian in nature. This means that the UNHCR must actively 
seek to ensure that its operations are not used to pursue the political agendas of states.
3
 This 
political neutrality is central to the credibility of the UNHCR and is necessary if the agency is 
to continue to receive unrestricted access to those in need. 
The UNHCR’s primary purpose is to find ‘durable solutions’ for refugees that will allow 
them to rebuild their lives in dignity and peace.
4
 Working in close partnership with the 
international community the UNHCR promotes three ‘durable solutions’ in pursuit of this 
goal. The first and preferred solution is that of voluntary repatriation. This reflects the fact 
that most refugees want to return to their homelands and rebuild their lives in a familiar 
environment once it is safe for them to do so. To facilitate voluntary repatriation the UNHCR 
establishes protective legal frameworks and agreements with states that seek to safeguard the 
reintegration of refugees into their home countries. These legal frameworks are designed to 
ensure that returning refugees’ right of national protection is re-established with their home 
state and that they are not subjected to further persecution or discrimination in the home 
countries. In principle, the UNHCR only promotes voluntary repatriation as a ‘durable 
solution’ if the state in question has entered a post-conflict phase and its internal situation is 
deemed to be suitable for refugee repatriation. 
The second ‘durable solution’ is that of local integration, whereby refugees are resettled in 
their country of first asylum. For many refugees, circumstances in their home countries are 
such that safe return is unlikely to be possible in the foreseeable future. For others 
repatriation is an undesired solution because of the traumatic events they experienced in their 
home countries.
5
 In such cases, refugees are granted citizenship in their country of first 
asylum and can set about rebuilding their lives in close geographical proximity to their home 
countries. Local integration works most effectively where ethnic or tribal links cross state 
borders, as it enables refugees to maintain social ties with members of their own nation. This 
helps to make resettlement in a new country much easier. However, local integration can 
sometimes be a difficult option to implement because many of the countries neighbouring 
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those that are generating refugees are economically and politically unstable themselves.
6
 
They are therefore in no position to be able to absorb a new population when their own 
people may be struggling. This has particularly been the case in refugee crises in sub-Saharan 
Africa where there are few countries suitably placed to accept refugees. 
In cases where both repatriation and local integration are deemed to be unsuitable options, the 
only remaining solution available to refugees is third country resettlement. In theory, 
resettlement within a country that is well equipped to accept large numbers of refugees 
appears to be an ideal solution to the problems associated with forced displacement. These 
are countries that are free from conflict and are economically in the best possible position to 
assist refugees to rebuild their lives. Yet of the total number of refugees that exist in the 
world, only around 1 percent are resettled in third countries.
7
 This reflects the fact that third 
country resettlement remains the UNHCR’s least preferred ‘durable solution’ for a number of 
reasons. First, the level of cultural adjustment required on the part of host societies and 
refugees alike can threaten the prospects for long term integration for refugees. Refugees are 
often resettled in a country where the society, language, and culture are completely foreign to 
them which naturally poses a number of challenges.  
More importantly perhaps, third country resettlement is perceived by the UNHCR and its 
primary donor states as being financially too costly compared with the other two solutions.
8
 
There are only a small number of states that have established resettlement programmes with 
the UNHCR and accept refugees in annual quotas; the US, Canada, and Australia are among 
those states with the highest quotas. Yet the total number of refugees accepted for 
resettlement by third countries worldwide stands at 80,000 per year, while the UNHCR 
estimated that more than 800,000 refugees required third country resettlement in 2011 alone.
9
 
Despite the UNHCR’s appeal to the international community to drastically increase this total, 
a vast chasm exists between the need for third country resettlement and the international 
community’s willingness to ‘share the burden’ of accepting refugees for resettlement. 
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The UNHCR’s ‘Facilitated Repatriation’ Policy in Afghanistan 
Following the start of the intervention the UNHCR moved swiftly into Afghanistan to help 
coordinate the international response to the refugee crisis. In January 2002 it announced that 
a policy of ‘facilitated repatriation’ would be implemented as the preferred ‘durable solution’ 
to the crisis. The agency envisaged that of the almost 4 million Afghan refugees living 
abroad, an estimated 800,000 would return to Afghanistan in 2002. Over the course of the 
ensuing five years the UNHCR and its partner states would plan and implement a 
“programme to anchor refugees and enable their durable reintegration into their homes and 
communities” in Afghanistan.10 The repatriation programme was planned in two distinct 
phases. The first would take place immediately following the physical return of refugees, 
whereby returnees would be provided with their basic humanitarian needs by the UNHCR in 
coordination with the various other international humanitarian organisations operating in 
Afghanistan.
11
 The purpose of this first phase was simply to ensure that all returnees had 
adequate shelter, food, and water. The second phase would then seek to ensure a smooth 
transition from the immediate survival needs of returnees to the sustainable development of 
their lives. This would involve the much greater challenge of making vast improvements in 
key areas such as employment, education, and health care in partnership with international 
development organisations such as the World Bank and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP). 
When the UNHCR’s ‘facilitated repatriation’ programme commenced 1 March 2002 it 
immediately had the desired effect of returning large numbers of refugees to Afghanistan. 
The programme was hailed as “an overwhelming success” by the UN and the intervening 
coalition.
12
 By the end of August, just six months after it began, the total number of refugees 
who had been repatriated under the programme exceeded 2 million. This was a monumental 
figure that more than doubled the UNHCR’s previous record high for an assisted return 
operation. In fact, the volume of returnees was so great that the UNHCR became increasingly 
concerned that it lacked the necessary operational capacity and funding to facilitate the 
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repatriation of such a vast numbers of refugees.
13
 The large scale return was the intended 
outcome of the programme from the outset, yet the UNHCR was left unprepared for the sheer 
volume of refugees that heeded its call to repatriate. The agency was forced to appeal for 
greater operational funding from its donor states in order to handle the mass repatriation. 
It is important to understand the reasons why so many Afghan refugees decided to repatriate 
when they did given the desperate situation that existed in Afghanistan. In their analysis of 
the key factors that prompted so many refugees to repatriate in 2002, Turton and Marsden 
conclude that two factors in particular had the greatest impact. The first was related the great, 
but ultimately misplaced, expectations about the level and impact of international assistance 
in Afghanistan.
14
 The UN, the international coalition, and the new Afghan government sent 
strong public messages about the positive future of Afghanistan. The international 
community had already pledged $4.5 billion for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, while 
Hamid Karzai had appealed for all Afghans to return and help rebuild a new Afghanistan 
within which there would be opportunity for all. The media in Iran and Pakistan also led 
refugees to believe that they would receive generous assistance from the UN in the form of 
cash grants and assistance packages to help them rebuild their lives once they reached 
home.
15
 Furthermore, the vast presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan also suggested that 
the international community was genuinely committed towards improving security in the 
country. This time around Afghanistan was not going to be abandoned in the manner it was 
after the Soviet defeat in 1989. 
The second was due to the increasing pressure that was being placed on refugees to leave 
from their countries of asylum. From the viewpoint of Pakistan and Iran, if the UNHCR was 
not going to resettle the Afghan refugees within their borders in wealthy third countries then 
their only option was repatriation. As discussed in the previous chapter, the governments of 
these countries adopted various policies that were designed to persuade Afghans that it was 
time to return home, including the arbitrary detention of Afghans and forced deportation. It 
was these refugees who were having the most difficulty remaining in their countries of 
asylum that would have been most likely to have taken the encouraging messages to 
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repatriate at face value and returned to Afghanistan.
16
 The increasingly untenable conditions 
of asylum in Pakistan and Iran was a push-factor that proved strong enough to convince many 
refugees that life would be better back in Afghanistan. 
For many, however, this was not the case. The judgement of the UNHCR’s repatriation 
programme as “an overwhelming success” was as premature as the return movement itself.17 
For, while the programme may have been a statistical success story, refugees were returning 
to a situation that offered them little opportunity to rebuild their lives. As Turton and 
Marsden point out, they were returning to a country: 
“where there was, effectively, no functioning state; where the worst drought in 150 
years was entering its fourth year...; where there was continuing military activity by 
coalition forces and between rival local powers; where ethnic violence... had 
contributed to the internal displacement of hundreds of thousands of people; where 
institutions of law and order were either non-existent or highly rudimentary; and where 
the provision of basic services, such as drinking water, health, and education was 
rudimentary and seriously under-resourced.”
18
 
Therefore, rather than being measured on the number of refugees who returned to 
Afghanistan, the true success of the UNHCR repatriation programme had to be measured on 
the extent to which it represented a ‘durable solution’ for those refugees who returned. 
The greatest challenge around the durability of repatriation was how to overcome the relief-
development gap for the returning refugees. Repatriation would not represent a durable 
solution unless refugees were able to smoothly transition from the emergency aid needed to 
sustain their lives over the short term to the development aid needed to sustain their lives over 
the longer term and ultimately to self-sufficiency. But the problem for the UNHCR was that it 
possessed neither the mandate nor the resources to assume control of developmental 
activities. The agency was therefore dependent upon various international development 
organisations and its own donor states to ensure the sustainability of refugee repatriation. 
This problem was highlighted when, after a successful first phase of the reintegration process, 
serious doubts began to arise over the sustainability of repatriation due to a lack of progress 
in the second phase. The UNHCR had great difficulty receiving adequate funding from its 15 
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donor states in the Afghan Support Group, who advised the UNHCR that the limited funding 
it was providing for major development projects would not be made available until April 
2003.
19
 It is in this context that Turton and Marsden describe the UNHCR’s position in 
Afghanistan as one of being “alone on the dance floor” while it urged its reluctant 
development partners for support to ensure that repatriation was indeed a ‘durable solution’.20 
Returned refugees expressed widespread disappointment at the lack of international 
assistance they received upon their return to Afghanistan. Many felt as though they had been 
intentionally misled by the false promises of the UN, the coalition, and the new Afghan 
government.
21
 
In light of the lack of development activity and seeming lack of international commitment to 
help refugees repatriate successfully, the initial euphoria around the UNHCR’s repatriation 
programme quickly turned into anxiety about the sustainability of the mass return.
22
 This was 
based on the fact that many of those who had returned under the programme in the summer 
were not in a position to survive the winter. The UNHCR’s repatriation policy came under 
strong criticism from humanitarian groups who urged the agency to cease its repatriation 
programme because conditions on the ground in Afghanistan were just not suitable for 
refugee return.
23
 Moreover, the return of so many refugees hampered the reconstruction effort 
in Afghanistan by putting even more pressure on an already fragile infrastructure and under-
funded reconstruction effort. In the search for a quick and inexpensive solution to the Afghan 
refugee crisis, the full costs and benefits of repatriation were not adequately considered.
24
 
The UNHCR’s repatriation programme ultimately proved to be counterproductive to the aim 
of achieving a solution to the refugee crisis as many of those who did repatriate were once 
again forcibly displaced. 
In the post-mortem of the UNHCR’s repatriation programme it is important to note that even 
in the planning stage of the programme, the agency had expressed its concern that the 
conditions in Afghanistan were unsuitable for repatriation. It was for this reason that the 
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UNHCR was reluctant to define its programme as one of ‘promoted repatriation’ and instead 
opted to define it as a programme of ‘facilitated repatriation’. The distinction between the 
two terms may appear innocuous, but it is one which is, symbolically at least, highly 
significant. The UNHCR’s decision to define its repatriation programme as ‘facilitated’ rather 
than ‘promoted’ was an explicit attempt to allow the agency to exercise its mandate to help 
refugees repatriate “without appearing to induce, encourage, or ‘promote’ return to a 
fundamentally unsatisfactory situation”.25 This distinction was not meant to discriminate 
between two different policies, but to create a formal difference where none actually existed 
in practice. The language of ‘facilitated repatriation’ was used as a shield to allow the 
UNHCR to encourage refugees to return to an unsafe situation while appearing to abide by 
the international legal standards around voluntary repatriation.
26
  
The Fallacy of the UNHCR’s Non-Political Mandate 
Rather than a success story, the UNHCR’s repatriation programme in Afghanistan can 
therefore be described more accurately as a self-inflicted disaster for the agency. The 
UNHCR conceded in hindsight that it had mismanaged the process and that “the Afghanistan 
experience... had proven to be a much more sustained and complex challenge than initially 
anticipated”.27 However, simply attributing the problematic repatriation experienced to 
“mismanagement” fails to take into account the significance of some of the other factors that 
contributed to the failed programme. For, the fact that the logic behind the repatriation of 
refugees to Afghanistan was fundamentally flawed from the outset suggests that the simple 
mismanagement of how the programme was carried out was not the main source of the 
problem. The UNHCR was returning refugees to a situation that was clearly unsustainable, 
suggesting that the policy of facilitated repatriation was not chosen with the best interests of 
Afghanistan’s refugees in mind.28 The fundamental question that is raised here is: why 
therefore did the UNHCR pursue a policy that ran firmly against the best interests of the very 
refugees it is mandated to protect? 
To answer this question, it is necessary to first understand the intense political pressure that is 
placed upon the operations of the UNHCR by states. As an intergovernmental organisation, 
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the UNHCR remains dependent upon states for its funding. In total, almost 98 percent of the 
agency’s funding comes from voluntary contributions from state governments. The majority 
is donated by a small number of affluent western states; for example, in 2002 the US, Japan, 
and countries from the European Union accounted for 94 percent of all government 
contributions to the UNHCR.
29
 The result of this is that these major donor states invariably 
exercise a disproportionate amount of influence on the agency. These major donor states 
exert leverage on the UNHCR by earmarking their donations for programmes that are of 
particular political interest to them. They donate vastly disproportionate amounts of aid to a 
select few cases of political worth while providing a small amount of funds to the dozens of 
remaining cases.
30
 In 2000, for instance, the UNHCR received ten times the per capita 
expenditure to resolve the refugee crisis in Kosovo than the total it received for African 
refugee crises in the same year. In 2002, 80 percent of all government contributions the 
UNHCR received were earmarked, the highest percentage in the agency’s history.31 
The UNHCR also comes under strong political pressure from both host states and refugees’ 
states of origin. Host states are states that are forced to host vast numbers of refugees due to 
their geographic proximity to refugee crises. Many host states struggle to handle the vast 
numbers of refugees that pour across their borders and therefore develop hostility towards 
refugees; the hostility of Pakistan and Iran towards Afghan refugees has already been 
discussed in this thesis. This hostility towards refugees placed a large amount of pressure on 
the UNHCR to find timely alternative solutions for refugees to help ease the sense of burden 
that host states feel.
32
 On the other hand, many states from which refugees originate place a 
large amount of pressure on the UNHCR to encourage the return of refugees that have 
previously fled their borders.
33
 The return of refugees is a powerful symbol of a 
government’s legitimacy, both in the eyes of its own people and of the international 
community. As such there is a clear incentive for states in post-conflict situations to have as 
many of their refugees repatriated as possible. This was clearly the case in Afghanistan, 
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where the UNHCR came under strong pressure from the Afghan government and UNAMA to 
boost the new government’s legitimacy by repatriating as many refugees as possible.34 
In spite of the fact that the UNHCR has an explicitly non-political mandate, the agency is in 
fact highly politicised and is strongly influenced by the interests of its major donor and host 
governments. The UNHCR is increasingly faced with economic and political pressures to 
rethink its operational mandate in order to demonstrate its ‘relevance’ to its donor states. It is 
so dependent upon its major donors that it is left in no position to challenge the policy 
demands put forward by these states, even if those policies run against the best interests of 
refugees.
35
 The UNHCR itself has admitted that it has often adapted its operations to align 
with the interests of its donor states.
36
 Such instances of ‘humanitarian pragmatism’ have 
caused widespread concern within the international humanitarian community that the 
UNHCR has diluted its primary function of protecting refugees. It has forsaken the 
humanitarian principles upon which it was founded and has instead become an instrument for 
the world’s most powerful states to pursue their political interests.37 
 
In spite of its non-political mandate, the UNHCR has demonstrated in recent years that it is 
more concerned with securing favour with its major donor states than it is with fulfilling its 
mandate to protect refugees. The UNHCR is in fact a highly political organisation whose 
operations are largely aligned with the political interests of the world’s most powerful states. 
This was evident in Afghanistan where the UNHCR pursued a policy of repatriation that had 
little chance of providing a ‘durable solution’ to the Afghan refugee crisis because this policy 
was dictated by its donor states. The agency’s weak position in relation to its funders meant it 
had little alternative but to adopt a policy of repatriation despite the fact that it ran against the 
best interests of the refugees it was mandated to protect.  
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CHAPTER 6: THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO AFGHANISTAN’S 
REFUGEE CRISIS 
 
The UNHCR’s choice of policy in response to the Afghan refugee crisis becomes easier to 
understand through analysing the manner in which the international community itself 
responded to the crisis and how it treats refugees more broadly. Despite the fact that the 
majority of the world’s states have accepted legal responsibility to provide assistance to 
refugees as signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention, many of these states have failed to 
turn a positive humanitarian sentiment into positive humanitarian action. Rather, they have 
often expressed a deep-seated reluctance to ‘share the burden’ of assisting refugees, and have 
actively sought to avoid fulfilling their moral and legal obligations to refugees in a number of 
ways. The following chapter explores the general sense of antipathy with which the world’s 
states respond to refugee crises before placing the Afghan case in this context by exploring 
the Australian response in particular to the Afghan refugee crisis. 
The Role of States in Solving Refugee Crises 
Any successful resolution of a refugee crisis within the contemporary international system is 
heavily dependent upon the cooperation and hospitality of states. It is only through the re-
acquisition of citizenship, either through repatriation to their country of origin or resettlement 
in another, that refugees are able to regain the fundamental rights that are necessary to ensure 
a secure and sustainable existence. The dominant concept of identity in the political world 
today is one which is based upon a political triangulation of nation, state, and territory. It is as 
a citizen of a particular nation-state, existing within a legally-defined territory, that 
individuals today derive fundamental rights such as those of equal treatment, access to 
sources of livelihoods, and freedom of movement. In this sense, belonging to a state is 
instrumental in achieving a desirable standard of living.
38
 
By their very definition, refugees have been forced to renounce their belonging to a particular 
state in a bid to survive. Michael Dillon describes a refugee as someone who “can no longer 
safely respond to their previous name [and] cannot be hailed securely by their original ethnic, 
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religious, social, or political designation”.39 In giving up their political identity and fleeing 
their homelands, refugees are not only deprived of their homes and property, but also their 
basic human dignity and the ability to enjoy the security and freedom that only state 
citizenship can provide.
40
 Conceptions of universal human rights are shallow or even 
meaningless if one does not belong to a political community within which these rights are 
able to be secured.
41
 As Hannah Arendt explains, “the Rights of Man, supposedly inalienable, 
prove to be unenforceable... whenever people appear who are no longer citizens of any 
sovereign state”.42 It is therefore only through the reacquisition of state citizenship that 
refugees regain the rights, freedoms, and security that they had previously enjoyed as citizens 
of their homelands. 
It is in this situation of rightlessness that refugees become wards of an international 
humanitarian regime that remains entirely dependent upon the endorsement, financial 
support, and generosity of states. It is states that hold the most important role in providing 
durable solutions to refugee crises around the world. The 1951 Refugee convention affirms 
this point and urges cooperation and ‘burden sharing’ among the international community of 
states in order to adequately respond to the needs of refugees.
43
 With more than three-
quarters of the world’s states as signatories to the Refugee Convention, the international 
community has responded admirably to this plea. In signing and ratifying the Convention 
and/or its 1967 Protocol, the majority of the world’s states have supplemented their moral 
responsibility to assist refugees with a legal responsibility to accept refugees into their 
borders and assist with their resettlement. 
During the Cold War era, the world’s states expressed their strong commitment towards 
fulfilling these responsibilities to refugees. Refugees who fled from the communist Eastern 
Bloc countries in particular were welcomed with open arms by western states such as the US, 
Canada, and Australia. It was emphasised by the western states that the most suitable ‘durable 
solution’ for these refugee crises was third country resettlement because the brutality that 
                                                 
39M Dillon, 'The Scandal of the Refugee: Some Reflections on the “Inter” of International Relations and 
Continental Thought', in D Campbell and M.J. Shapiro (eds.), Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and 
World Politics. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). p.102. 
40
 J.C. Isaac, 'A New Guarantee on Earth: Hannah Arendt on Human Dignity and the Politics of Human Rights', 
American Political Science Review, 90/1 (1996). p.63. 
41
 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1979). p.273. 
42
 Ibid. p.293. 
43
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2007), 'The 1951 Refugee Convention: Questions and 
Answers', http://www.unhcr.org/3c0f495f4.html. accessed 03 October 2012. p. 6. 
  
76 
 
characterised the Eastern Bloc made repatriation unsuitable.
44
 Turton and Marsden suggest 
that this commitment towards refugees reflected the fact that the Refugee Convention was a 
powerful political weapon in the arsenal of the western powers during the Cold War.
45
 The 
desperate circumstances of the Eastern Bloc refugees provided an opportunity to publicly 
revile the communist world as brutal violators of their citizens’ human rights. In this sense, 
the flow of refugees from east to west served a valuable political purpose in the ideological 
battle against communism. 
However, refugees lost their ideological value following the end of the Cold War. From the 
perspective of the western states there was no longer any significant political gain to be made 
as a result of accepting refugees. Consequently, where refugees once provided proof of 
western superiority over the communists, they quickly became considered a liability. 
Predictably, the focus of the international refugee regime began to shift in the early 1990s 
from a focus of asylum and resettlement to one of containment and repatriation.
46
 This shift 
was rationalised on the logic that displaced people do not necessarily have to leave their own 
country to find protection and that they were likely to be better off remaining within their 
own regions.
47
 Furthermore, international assistance should be used to help deter new 
population flows rather than promote them. It was argued that in order to do this the focus of 
the international refugee regime should focus on repatriating those who had already left 
rather than resettling them elsewhere.
48
 
State Reluctance to Share the ‘Refugee Burden’ 
This focus on keeping refugees within or near their countries of origin has remained prevalent 
into the current era of refugee protection. While refugees today remain heavily dependent 
upon the commitment of states to the principles of humanitarianism, the level to which states 
are committed to assisting refugees varies significantly between them. The widely held 
attitude towards refugees is that, as nations, we are under no obligation to accept any refugees 
at all; if we do accept some, it is not the fulfilment of an obligation but rather is an indication 
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of our overtly generous character.
49
 This view is exemplified by the United States, whose 
Office of the US Coordination for Refugee Affairs maintains that the underlying principle 
that guides refugee admissions is “an exceptional ex gratia act provided by the US in 
furthering foreign and humanitarian policies”.50  In accordance with this attitude, states 
frequently respond to refugee issues with a high degree of selectivity, exercising the limits of 
discretion that states enjoy in the application of international law. 
The general sense of aversion that states have demonstrated towards refugees since the end of 
the Cold War coincided with a disturbing shift in the terms of refugee discourse. Rather than 
being framed solely in the language of protection, discussions around refugees increasingly 
began to be placed in the context of various other political considerations.
51
 For instance, the 
language of refugee assistance began to be transformed into discussions around how refugees 
may pose a threat to the wellbeing of states. Providing assistance to refugees has increasingly 
become perceived as a burden by states, both in terms of the financial costs incurred and the 
perceived negative social costs.
52
 Refugees often require a large degree of initial assistance in 
basic areas such as housing, employment, health, and education, and many states are opposed 
to what they perceive as putting the needs of foreigners ahead of their own citizens. In the 
post 9-11 world in particular, refugees have also commonly been framed as a major threat to 
international security and a source of regional instability.
53
 The fact that the Taliban military 
was largely made up of Afghan refugees recruited from refugee camps in Pakistan is a 
frequently cited example of the potential security threat that refugees may pose to their host 
states. It is in the context of this shift in the discourse around refugee issues that many states 
have expressed a deep-seated reluctance towards accepting refugees and have taken various 
measures to avoid fulfilling their responsibilities as signatories of the Refugee Convention.  
Containment through ‘Preventive Protection’ 
One such measure that states have employed is the promotion of ‘preventive protection’, a 
recent concept that fits firmly within the paradigm shift that occurred in the early 1990s. 
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‘Preventive protection’ may be defined as “the establishment or undertaking of specific 
activities inside the country of origin so that people no longer feel compelled to cross borders 
in search of protection and assistance.”54 In applying the concept of preventive protection, the 
focus of refugee assistance is shifted from the traditional ‘right to leave’ one’s country in 
order to seek protection to ‘the right to remain’.55 Those who have been displaced are 
discouraged from seeking refuge by crossing an international border by providing them with 
assistance still within their own countries. Rather than having displaced people fleeing to 
safety, preventive protection aims to bring safety to those displaced, by force if necessary, in 
order to prevent refugee crises from spilling over into neighbouring countries.
56
  
The emergence of the concept of preventive protection was closely associated with the sense 
of liberal optimism that arose from the end of the Cold War. Having defeated the evil of 
communism, western liberals believed that the world would enter the dawn of a new world 
order based on liberal values, where even the most enduring conflicts were solvable.
57
 The 
concept of preventive protection offered a new alternative to the tradition three ‘durable 
solutions’ for refugees. It promised to prevent refugees from crossing an international border 
in the first place by solving the kinds of underlying problems that result in forced migration. 
In theory, this would be achieved through missions of humanitarian intervention around the 
world whereby foreign troops would protect ‘safe-zones’ within troubled countries. These 
‘safe-zones’ would enable displaced populations to find refuge, temporary at least, without 
having to leave their home countries. Meanwhile, the international community would come 
together to address both the root causes and the direct causes of conflicts that put populations 
at risk.
58
 This optimistic blueprint for solving the world’s refugee issues was later supported 
by the ICISS, which described the ‘responsibility to prevent’ as “the single most important 
element” of its Responsibility to Protect (R2P) report of 2001.59 
Unsurprisingly, the application of preventive protection in practice has yielded highly 
ambiguous results. With the exception of Northern Iraq in the first Gulf War, attempts to 
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provide ‘safe-zones’ of refuge to displaced persons within their countries of origin have 
proven “costly, ineffective...[and a] detrimental substitute for asylum”.60 Critics such as 
Jennifer Hyndman have rejected preventive protection as a legitimate humanitarian practice. 
She maintains that that it is simply a donor-sponsored attempt to avoid their international 
legal obligations to would-be refugees by containing them within their countries of origin.
61
 
With refugees increasingly being perceived as a threat to state wellbeing, the traditional 
resettlement countries of the west have demonstrated an eagerness to maintain what they 
perceive to be a desirable amount of space and distance from the vast waves of refugees in 
the developing world.
62
 The UNHCR is often urged by its major donor states to keep refugees 
within their countries of origin or in neighbouring states despite the fact that this often runs 
against the best interests of refugees. By keeping refugees ‘over there’, far from the borders 
of the donor countries of the west, preventive protection may accurately be seen as a political 
strategy of containment that prioritises the interests of these states ahead of those of refugees.  
Return through ‘Voluntary Repatriation’ 
In some cases, the containment of refugees within their countries of origin is neither practical 
nor possible. The unpredictable nature of political conflict can often result in vast numbers of 
refugees pouring across international borders in the earliest stages of conflict or even in 
anticipation of conflict. For refugees that have already crossed an international border, the 
policy most eagerly pursued by states (often through the UNHCR) is that of ‘voluntary 
repatriation’. Repatriation is often framed in association with positive images of refugees 
resuming normal lives, free from the threat of oppression and conflict, within countries that 
enjoy well functioning basic services and government institutions. But this romanticized 
notion of repatriation is clearly an exception to the way it usually works.
63
 In reality, the 
successful repatriation involves much more than simply crossing back over an international 
border. It is a complex process within which various political, economic, social, and cultural 
dimensions of reintegration must be addressed in order for it to be sustainable.
64
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However, as demonstrated in the case of Afghanistan, the UNHCR and its donor states are 
often less concerned with the sustainability of refugee repatriation than with the mere 
physical return of refugees to their countries of origin. While repatriation is often promoted 
as the best solution to a refugee crisis, the fundamental question here is: the best solution for 
whom? The overt promotion of repatriation has turned the physical return of refugees into an 
end in itself, with repatriation being conducted without adequate consideration as to whether 
it is in the best interest of those being returned and the country to which they are returning.
65
 
In the case of Afghanistan, it was clear that the UNHCR’s repatriation programme was 
premature and ran against the best interests of both the refugees and the new Afghan state. 
Had the UNHCR’s repatriation programme been delayed by a year or two, fewer refugees 
would have returned because of unrealistic expectations, while the new Afghan state could 
have dedicated more time, effort, and resources into reconstructing the country in order to 
make refugee repatriation more sustainable in the long run.
66
 
But the major donor states of the international refugee regime are unwilling to share the 
burden of refugee protection. In fact, they actively seek to avoid providing the minimal rights 
to which refugees are entitled under the Refugee Convention. Many states refuse to extend 
their social responsibility beyond their own borders, as indicated by the increasing hostility 
shown towards asylum-seekers and the declining number of refugee admissions to western 
countries.
67
 In this context, the UNHCR is often left with little alternative but to pursue a 
policy of repatriation despite acknowledging that this often represents a less than desirable 
solution for refugees. 
Avoidance through Legal Manoeuvres 
States have employed various other methods in addition to preventive protection and 
repatriation that are designed to avoid the ‘burden’ of fulfilling their obligations towards 
refugees. One of the most common ways they have done this is by exploiting loopholes in 
international law to limit those who qualify to receive the protection of the international 
refugee regime. At the heart of this issue is the contentious understanding of who exactly is 
defined as a ‘refugee’ within international law. The definition of ‘refugee’ that states agreed 
to adopt in the Refugee Convention is based upon the status of those displaced in Europe 
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during WWII. As Hyndman explains, the Convention definition “was intended to distribute 
the European refugee burden without any binding obligation to... non-European refugees.”68 
As such, the Convention definition of ‘refugee’ is based firmly around those who suffered 
persecution on the grounds of civil and political rights. Refugees who are victims of 
oppression on other grounds, such as socio-economic rights, are legally excluded from 
receiving the protection and assistance provided by the international refugee regime. 
However, the majority of the world’s refugees today, living in the developing world, face 
violence on a broader scale and for different reasons than those of post-war Europe. Yet as a 
result of the Refugee Convention’s western-centric formal requirements, states are not 
obligated to provide them with protection. Therefore, the primary definition of ‘refugee’ 
agreed to by states serves to uphold a geographically unequal system of refugee protection 
that places the majority of those requiring assistance outside the scope of refugee protection 
under international law. 
In limiting their assistance to only those refugees that conform to the Refugee Convention 
definition, states have also excluded internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the protection 
provided by the international refugee regime. While refugee law does clearly distinguish 
between the rights and entitlements of IDPs and Convention refugees, in reality these 
categories exist only because of marginal differences in time and space. In fact, some 
UNHCR policymakers maintain that refugees and IDPs are qualitatively part of the same 
group, but are divided artificially by an arbitrary political border.
69
 Yet IDPs remain excluded 
from the UNHCR’s protection mandate. This has resulted in a serious gap in the international 
system for the protection and assistance of the world’s estimated 20 to 30 million IDPs.70 The 
lack of clarity within the international refugee regime over the responsibility to protect 
refugees that have not crossed an international border has led to the neglect of this vast 
population that require protection. 
Another group of refugees that have fallen victim to the ambiguity of international law is that 
of asylum-seekers, otherwise known as spontaneous refugees. Strictly speaking, asylum-
seekers come under the protection of international refugee law as soon as they cross an 
international border. Article 33 of the Refugee Convention states that no state “shall expel or 
return [refouler] a refugee... to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
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threatened”.71 Asylum-seekers can therefore not legally be expelled against their will, at least 
until their cases have been examined and their refugee status has been determined. However, 
many states have interpreted the principle of non-refoulement in a manner that allows them to 
reject asylum-seekers from gaining access to their borders.
72
 For instance, the United States 
and other Western states have argued that the principle of non-refoulement applies only to 
those persons who meet the standard of persecution as outlined in the Refugee Convention. 
They therefore do not afford the right of non-refoulement to asylum-seekers that are fleeing 
general states of violence or civil war, despite the fact that various international legal 
authorities demand that they should be.
73
 Similarly, some states maintain that that the 
principle of non-refoulement only applies to asylum-seekers once they have actually entered 
a state’s territory. They have then implemented controversial policies of interdicting refugees 
at sea or apprehending them at off-shore detention centres in order to prevent them from 
accessing their territory.
74
 
Deterrence Measures Against Refugees 
Finally, in the hope of deterring refugees from their countries many states have adopted 
policies that aim to make their countries less appealing to refugees. These deterrence 
measures have typically taken three main forms. The first has been to limit the physical 
access refugees have to their territories, a category within which the aforementioned policies 
of interdiction and off-shore processing both fit. The second has been to create discontent for 
refugees upon arrival by rendering the conditions of stay in their countries less attractive. 
This has typically been done by providing a minimal level of resettlement assistance to 
refugees upon their arrival, or by scattering refugees of the same nationality to remote regions 
of the country in order to hamper any sense of social cohesion between them. The third way 
in which states have sought to deter refugees is to increase the difficulty with which they are 
able to gain full citizenship rights. In some countries, alternative statuses to citizenship have 
been specifically created for refugees that grant fewer rights than citizenship. In Australia 
from 1999 to 2008, for instance, asylum-seekers who were granted refugee status were not 
granted citizenship, but were given a three year Temporary Protection Visa (TPV). Not only 
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did this create strong feelings of insecurity for refugees in their new situations, but it also 
limited their access to a range of entitlements and services.
75
 TPV holders were forced to 
endure a three year period of uncertainty before reapplying for permanent refugee status, 
which would be granted only on the basis that conditions in their country of origin remained 
unchanged. These kinds of policies demonstrate the explicit aversion that states have towards 
refugees. Not only do they represent an erosion of the core principles of refugee protection in 
the name of selfish realism, but are also a flagrant violation of the humanitarian principles 
that the international refugee regime claims to uphold. 
The International Inhospitality towards Afghanistan’s Refugees 
At the time of the intervention in Afghanistan, Afghans had constituted the largest single 
group of refugees in the world for almost two decades. During this period the vast majority 
had fled to Afghanistan’s nearest neighbours: Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
These countries struggled to support the millions of refugees that spilled over their borders 
due to the fact that these countries themselves are susceptible to humanitarian problems. 
Weary after years of hosting such vast numbers of refugees with minimum international 
interest or support and no prospect of a solution to the cause of refugee flows, many of these 
countries tightened their refugee policies to limit the number of Afghan refugees they were 
willing to accept.
76
 
The traditional refugee resettlement countries of the west, being in the best financial position 
to accept large numbers of refugees, also admitted some Afghan refugees into their countries, 
albeit in much smaller numbers. Countries such as the United States, the UK, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand and the countries of the European Union have established quota 
refugee programmes with the UNHCR whereby they agree to resettle a proportion of the 
millions of existing Afghan refugees. These countries have also periodically accepted small 
numbers of asylum seekers from Afghanistan. However, by and large these states have 
sought to restrict the number of Afghan refugees they accept and have often implemented the 
kind of restrictionist policies discussed in the previous section towards Afghan refugees. 
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While this behaviour represents an explicit violation of the principles of humanitarianism on 
the part of these states, it also raises a specific question in the context of the Afghanistan 
intervention over the level of responsibility that these states have towards Afghan refugees. 
Given that many of these states were or remain active participants in the international military 
campaign in Afghanistan, it is logical to expect these countries to shoulder a greater sense of 
responsibility for assisting refugees. After all it is their military footprint that is partly 
responsible for the creation of these refugees. This section demonstrates that unfortunately 
states have not accepted this greater sense of responsibility towards assisting Afghan 
refugees, as highlighted by the case of Australian inhospitality towards Afghan refugees.  
The Case of Australian Inhospitality 
There are a number of countries that actively sought to limit the extent of their responsibility 
towards Afghan refugees in the context of the post-9/11 refugee crisis. Of the countries that 
were explored in Chapter 3 of this thesis, the Netherlands, the UK, and Australia all adopted 
some or all of the restrictionist policies discussed in the previous section in an attempt to limit 
the number of refugees they accepted from Afghanistan. Of these policies, the altering of 
immigration laws and the adoption of voluntary or involuntary repatriation policies were 
most common. For instance, in the Netherlands in October 2001 the Dutch government 
authorised the Dutch Immigration Service to stop processing Afghan asylum applications by 
removing the legal processing time limit of six months for Afghan claims. As A.R. Faquiri 
explains, “the Dutch Ministry of Justice seemed to hope that at the end of this period the 
situation in Afghanistan will be sufficiently safe to enable Afghans’ asylum applications to be 
rejected”.77 The Dutch government wanted to avoid issuing residence documents to Afghans 
who might have become eligible for deportation a short while later.
78
 Similarly in the UK, 
government officials indicated in early 2002 that they felt that Afghans in the UK should no 
longer be routinely granted ‘Exceptional Leave to Remain’, on the basis that the situation in 
Afghanistan had improved considerably.
79
 Immigration Minister, Beverly Hughes, concluded 
that the situation in Afghanistan had changed to such an extent that Afghan asylum seekers 
could soon return, or be forcibly returned, to the country. 
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But it is Australia that stands out as the country whose response to Afghan refugees was the 
most inhospitable. The case of Australia provides a text book example of the kind of negative 
attitude and policies that are undermining the spirit of the Refugee Convention and the 
effectiveness of the international refugee regime. For, in contrast to Australia’s enthusiasm to 
play a leading role in the military campaign in Afghanistan over the past decade, the country 
maintained an equally enthusiastic aversion towards assisting Afghan refugees.  
Australia’s general attitude of distain towards refugees dates back to the late 1990s, when the 
‘refugee issue’ in Australia became closely intertwined with negative aspects of 
undocumented migration and border control. However, it was the ‘Tampa Affair’ of August 
2001 that really brought the issue to a head. The incident revolved around the Norwegian 
freighter MV Tampa which had rescued 438 Afghan asylum-seekers from a small fishing 
vessel that was sinking in Australian waters. The MV Tampa requested access to the 
Australian mainland in order to offload the rescued asylum-seekers, among which were 
pregnant women and children requiring medical attention. But Australian authorities 
controversially refused the request. A high profile standoff ensued as the Australian 
government rebuked suggestions that it had an obligation under international law to allow the 
asylum-seekers to lodge asylum claims in Australia, as they had not stepped foot on 
Australian territory. With the MV Tampa anchored off the shore of Christmas Island, a legal 
territory of Australia, Australian Special Air Service Regiment (SASR) troops boarded the 
freighter and forcibly transferred the asylum-seekers onto an Australian Navy vessel. They 
were then transported to the small island country of Nauru where they were held in two 
detention camps while a solution could be forged. In the end, New Zealand accepted 
approximately 150 of the Tampa refugees in a bid to relieve the situation. Most of those who 
remained ultimately received Australian Temporary Protection Visas (TPVs), despite 
Australian Prime Minister John Howard’s declaration that none of the Tampa refugees would 
set foot on Australian soil. 
Within Australia the strong response of the government to the Tampa affair was strongly 
supported by politicians, the Australian media, and a large proportion of the Australian 
public. The proximity of the 9/11 attacks to the incident only served to strengthen the anti-
refugee sentiment that had already existed in Australia. In the election race of 2001 refugee 
issues became a headline issue, with Prime Minister Howard famously campaigning along 
the lines of “we decide who comes into this country and the circumstances in which they 
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come”. By most accounts, it was Howard’s tough stance on refugees that won him the 
election in November 2001,
80
 suggesting that the anti-immigration rhetoric of his political 
campaign had struck a powerful chord with the xenophobic tendencies of the Australian 
public.
81
 
During their decade-long involvement in Afghanistan from late 2001, Australia often 
demonstrated an eagerness to limit the number of Afghan refugees it accepted. Policies of 
interdiction, lengthy processing of asylum claims, detention at off-shore processing facilities, 
and limited-rights visas for refugees were all introduced by successive Australian 
governments from 2001 to 2010. Like the Netherlands and the UK before it, Australia also 
suspended the processing of new asylum applications from Afghanistan in 2010 on the basis 
that the circumstances in Afghanistan had improved to the extent that the ongoing refugee 
crisis was no longer a pressing issue.
82
 William Maley explains how this claim was nothing 
short of bizarre to those with recent experience on the ground in Afghanistan; the Afghan 
state was “so feeble that 'constitutional and legal reform to protect minorities' rights’ meant 
nothing for ordinary people.”83 The Australian government went a step further in January 
2011 by signing a controversial agreement with the Afghan government that allowed for the 
forcible return of Afghan asylum seekers that were judged “not to be in need of international 
protection” by the Australians.84 It claimed that it had begun to receive “better information 
about the situation in Afghanistan” which would allow it to make more informed decisions on 
asylum claims and subsequently return more Afghan asylum seekers to their country of 
origin.
85
 This policy of forcible repatriation was met with a large degree of scepticism from 
humanitarian advocates who questioned the validity of Australia’s refugee determination 
process. As Maley contends, “when approval rates for asylum claims suddenly plunge when 
the circumstances in the applicants' country of origin are deteriorating, there are grounds for 
believing that there is something very wrong with the assessment process.”86 Allowing the 
forcible return of refugees to their country of origin has the strong potential to expose 
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refugees to situations in which they genuinely fear persecution, and is therefore explicitly 
prohibited by the Refugee Convention. But in the contest between humanitarianism and the 
interests of states, such an agreement exposes the extent to which the latter takes 
overwhelming primacy over the former to the great detriment of the world’s refugees. 
 
The ability to resolve refugee crises around the world is heavily dependent upon the degree to 
which states are committed to the fulfilment of their humanitarian obligations to refugees. 
The severity of the global refugee crisis today is to a large extent connected to the fact that 
the world’s states have failed to fulfil these obligations. Refugee protection has increasingly 
become perceived by states as a burden, and many actively seek to avoid their responsibilities 
to refugees by adopting various restrictive policies. This was evident in the manner to which 
the international community responded to the Afghan refugee crisis. While many countries 
were willing to contribute to the military campaign in Afghanistan for the greater part of a 
decade, few countries were willing to match this with an equal degree of commitment and 
compassion towards the Afghan refugees, many of whom were displaced as a direct result of 
the international intervention. This exposes the manner in which refugee issues are neglected 
by states, which pay lip service to the principles of humanitarianism but rarely translate this 
into meaningful humanitarian action.
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CHAPTER 7: THE PLACE OF HUMANITARIANISM IN INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS 
 
Humanitarian crises are rarely contained within a specific locale, as the case of Afghanistan 
has aptly demonstrated. The negative consequences of humanitarian crises invariably affect 
neighbouring countries, regions, and often times the entire international community. But as I 
have argued in this thesis, the overt politicisation of humanitarianism has resulted in the most 
important decisions in response to humanitarian crises being taken not at the international 
level in the interests of all concerned, but at the national level by individual states. As such, it 
is virtually impossible to prevent considerations of national interest from intruding upon 
decisions regarding humanitarian action for ostensibly humanitarian purposes.
1
 The conflict 
between the humanitarian impulse and a state’s national interests is inevitable when states 
make such decisions, yet it is difficult to determine the extent to which these decisions are 
truly motivated by their altruistic concern for the victims of humanitarian crises or simply 
their own self-interests.  
Humanitarianism Driven by Realpolitik 
However, history has demonstrated that states do not in humanitarian action unless it serves 
in their national interest either directly or indirectly.
2
 In the case of Afghanistan, for instance, 
the international community only considered humanitarian intervention in the context of the 
global ‘War on Terror’, despite the fact that the country had been in the firm grasp of a 
humanitarian crisis for more than two decades. The timing of the intervention highlights the 
fact that considerations of national interest rather than humanitarian concerns ultimately play 
the most important role in determining whether states undertake humanitarian action. In this 
connection, it is perhaps understandable that in recent times, states’ decisions to commit to 
humanitarian action have been frequently subject to scrutiny and suspicion. 
                                                 
1
 M. Ayoob, 'Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty', The International Journal of Human Rights, 6/1 
(2002). p.85. 
2
 Ibid. p.86. 
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Considerations of national interest by states are rarely unambiguous. Within a state’s decision 
making process, there are a number of competing elements that are able to exert considerable 
influence on the direction of a state’s policies. In his study on the refugee policy of the United 
States, Tahl Tyson provides a valuable analysis of some of the elements that commonly 
influence the direction of states’ humanitarian policies. He finds that a state’s humanitarian 
policy is typically the product of compromise among four main influences which vary in 
strength and dominance over time.
3
  The first is humanitarian concerns, an influence that in 
theory should receive the highest priority in humanitarian policy given that it is humanitarian 
concerns that justify the very existence of a humanitarian policy. While the other competing 
interests are able to be pursued through alternative means, humanitarian concerns can only be 
pursued through the exercise of a state’s humanitarian policy. The second influence is that of 
foreign policy concerns, which appear to be an inherent element of humanitarian policy due 
to the fact that responding to humanitarian crises is often a highly political process. The two 
appear to have an interdependent relationship, with humanitarian policy often serving foreign 
policy goals while foreign policy decisions invariably dictate the direction of humanitarian 
policy. Tyson suggests that the question is therefore not how to eliminate foreign policy 
influence from humanitarian policy, but rather how to make foreign policy more responsive 
to humanitarian concerns.
4
 The third competing influence comes from special interest groups, 
which affect the direction of humanitarian policy by exerting political pressure upon 
government in particular relevance to their ethnic or religious affiliation. As a result of this 
pressure, humanitarian assistance tends to go to those not in the most need, but to those 
groups with the strongest political constituencies or diasporas in Western states. The final 
influence is that of domestic concerns, which affect the direction of humanitarian policy by 
way of public approval or disapproval. The manner in which domestic concerns affect a 
state’s humanitarian policy have been discussed in depth in the previous chapter, such as in 
the case of the Australian public’s support for their government’s tough stance on Afghan 
refugees. 
These various influences all affect the direction of a state’s humanitarian policy. Yet Tyson 
maintains that humanitarian policy can only be considered legitimate if it is based primarily 
upon a genuine concern for those in need. However, in analysing the degree of influence that 
                                                 
3
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Humanitarian Concerns from Competing Interests', Washington Law Reiew,65 (1990). p.921. 
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each of these competing elements has on humanitarian policy, he concludes that humanitarian 
concern ironically has the least amount because state governments “lack a strong vested 
interest in ensuring the humanitarian approach”.5 The other competing elements exert a much 
greater degree of influence, and this directly serves to undermine the capacity of 
humanitarian concerns to drive the direction of humanitarian policy. Humanitarian concerns 
are superseded by the political objectives of states, which ultimately define whether they are 
willing to commit to humanitarian action around the world. Put simply, this amounts to a 
fundamental perversion of the principles of humanitarianism and a corruption of the very 
purpose of humanitarian policy which is to simply provide assistance to those in need. 
Humanitarian action undertaken primarily in the pursuit of states’ own interests and only 
incidentally for the sake of those in desperate need of assistance unequivocally remains 
outside the boundaries of what may deemed to be legitimate humanitarianism. It is in the 
context of this distorted manifestation of humanitarianism that the international humanitarian 
regime may accurately be understood, in the words of B.S. Chimni, as “an instrument of an 
exploitative international system” which is “periodically mobilised to address its worst 
consequences”.6 
The Problems of Selectivity and Double Standards 
Being driven by the political interests of the world’s most powerful states has had a number 
of major implications for the international humanitarian regime. One of the most troubling is 
that, because it is defined by the often erratic and unpredictable will of these states, 
international humanitarian action has become subject to inconsistent application. States 
choose to respond to one instance of human suffering that warrants intervention in one part of 
the world but not a comparable instance elsewhere. One might ask, for instance, ‘why did 
Kosovo merit military intervention and why were its refugees met with such hospitality 
around the world whilst Rwanda was abandoned to suffer the worse genocide since WWII?’ 
Or, ‘why was Iraq subject to military intervention for the mistreatment of its Kurdish 
population but such action was never considered against Turkey for the same injustice?’ 
Similarly, ‘why were so many states willing to provide humanitarian support to Afghans on 
the other side of the world, but were so averse to doing so when Afghans who needed 
assistance arrived at their own territory?’ Far from involving themselves with all comparable 
                                                 
5
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6
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humanitarian injustices around the world, those states with the power to alleviate human 
suffering commit themselves selectively to some instances which warrant intervention while 
turning a blind eye to others. The degree of selectivity with which states engage in 
humanitarianism around the world is a problem that has developed into one of the primary 
criticisms of humanitarian action.
7
   
The problems of selectivity and double standards appear to be inevitable consequences of the 
existing international humanitarian regime. As staunch an advocate of humanitarian 
intervention as Thomas Weiss has been compelled to admit that in the application of 
humanitarianism, ‘there can be no universal imperative. States will pick and choose’.8 
Despite the fact that these problems are largely unwelcomed by humanitarian advocates, 
there are those who have sought to defend states’ use of a selective approach to 
humanitarianism. Among them is Mark Evans, who provides an example of two instances of 
humanitarian suffering that are very similar in their nature. Where one presents “insuperable 
logistical obstacles to a successful action or threatens outweighing moral costs should such 
action ever be attempted”. He argues that states would be justified in being selective about 
whether or not to intervene in such an instance; it would be unwise for states to intervene in 
order to bring about Tibetan independence from China, for example.
9
 It has also often been 
argued that while selectivity may not be desirable, it is better that states uphold the principles 
of humanitarianism selectively than not at all.
10
 
But the defence of selectivity fails when it is becomes the norm in applying the principles of 
humanitarianism. It is not the case that there are a limited number of exceptions where states 
are unable to undertake humanitarian action consistently. As Chimni explains, “both in the 
choice of situations and the nature of means used, [selectivity] is the defining characteristic of 
humanitarianism [today]”.11 The world’s most powerful states do not refrain from providing 
humanitarian assistance on the grounds of ‘insuperable logistical obstacles’; they simply 
commit themselves to those cases from which they stand to benefit and neglect those which 
offer no such dividends. Even within multilateral organisations like the United Nations, 
decisions to engage in humanitarian action are determined by the national interests of the 
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major powers. Military operations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, for instance, are 
agreed largely on the basis of shared interests or tradeoffs among the five permanent 
members of the Security Council.
12
 Kosovo merited intervention from the West because of its 
geographic proximity to the European Union and its importance for future access to Caspian 
Sea oil, while Rwanda offered no such incentives.
13
 Turkey was never considered for military 
intervention for its mistreatment of the Kurds because it was a NATO member and a key 
player in enforcing economic and military sanctions against Iraq.
14
 In Afghanistan, while 
intervention served the national security and political interests of the intervening states, 
Afghanistan’s refugees remained excluded from the reach of the international humanitarian 
regime and their suffering was largely left unattended. Decisions to intervene or not to 
intervene in humanitarian crises are guided by strategic and economic considerations that 
have little to do with humanitarian concerns, even if they are often justified with reference to 
such ideals. The neglect of Afghanistan’s refugees exposes the reality that it is realpolitik 
alone that ultimately distinguishes those humanitarian crises that receive the assistance of the 
international humanitarian regime from those that are left outside the margins of human 
compassion. 
The Problem of Humanitarian Abuse 
The fact that the international humanitarian regime is primarily driven by the national 
interests of the world’s most powerful states has also created a major problem around the 
potential abuse of the humanitarian rationale. ‘Abuse’ in this context refers to cases where 
humanitarian reasons are used to justify action, particularly military action, that is not 
primarily motivated by the humanitarian concerns espoused, but by the political interests of 
those carrying out the action. Since the end of the Cold War, humanitarian values have 
become an important means of justifying and lending legitimacy to actions taken in the 
pursuit of political objectives which are not primarily humanitarian in nature.
15
 The United 
States in particular has readily utilised the humanitarian rationale when seeking to justify 
self-interested military action against other states; the humanitarian justification for the US 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 was the most explicit example of humanitarian concerns being used 
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to justify political objectives, while the ‘humanitarian’ intervention in Afghanistan also fits 
within this context.
16
 
Whether such instances of military intervention may accurately be defined as exercise in 
humanitarianism has been a topic of considerable debate among scholars of international 
relations. The key point of contention here is whether it is the ostensibly humanitarian 
outcome of the intervention or rather the humanitarian motive of the intervener that invokes 
the legitimacy afforded by the principle of humanitarianism.
17
 As Alex Bellamy queries, 
“does it matter that an act was motivated by non-humanitarian concerns if the end result is a 
better world?” While it is clear that a number of factors shape a state’s decision to undertake 
humanitarian action, what is at issue here is the primary legitimising factor for an 
intervention rather than a singular factor. Some scholars have argued that a genuinely 
humanitarian motive should not be the threshold criteria for determining a legitimate case of 
humanitarian intervention. Fernando Teson, for instance, claims that the true test for a 
humanitarian intervention lies in whether the intervener has achieved a positive humanitarian 
outcome.
18
 In this context, he argues that the US-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq 
were in fact legitimate cases of humanitarian intervention, despite clearly serving the national 
interests of the US, because it was ultimately beneficial for the people of these countries to be 
liberated from the brutal regimes of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein respectively.
19
 
Yet while there is certainly an element of truth in this argument, there are reasons for 
distinguishing a military intervention that only coincidentally achieves a positive 
humanitarian outcome from a genuine humanitarian intervention. Elements of self-interest 
may inevitably creep into the decision making process, however a legitimate case of 
humanitarian action must be an act “wholly or primarily driven by the sentiment of 
humanity”. In this sense the primary motive for intervention must be guided by a sense of 
‘disinterest’. As Bhikhu Parekh explains, the humanitarian component of an intervention 
“should not be the fortunate but unintended by-product of an otherwise unjust act perpetrated 
for self interested reasons”.20 Within the existing system, however, this is precisely what 
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takes place. The intervention in Afghanistan was clearly not driven by the sentiment of 
humanity, for if it was, those states who contributed to the intervention would have 
demonstrated equal commitment in their response to Afghanistan’s refugee population. 
Furthermore, the United States and its allies would have intervened more than a decade 
earlier at the onset of Afghanistan’s humanitarian crisis. But in allowing states to legitimise 
the pursuit of their own interests on an elusive humanitarian outcome, the door to 
humanitarian abuse is flung wide open. It provides too great an opportunity for 
humanitarianism to be used as a pretext for the thwarted political aspirations of the world’s 
most powerful states. This, in turn, breeds a sense of contempt for humanitarianism that may 
ultimately undermine the effectiveness of humanitarian action around the world to the 
detriment of those in need of assistance. 
The Implications for those Forgotten 
It is in the context of the kinds of problems discussed above that the existing international 
humanitarian regime should be understood as an inherently misconstrued system. It is also as 
a consequence of these problems that the existing system fails to provide consistent and 
transparent humanitarian assistance to those in the greatest of need. The internal conflict that 
takes place between the principles of humanitarianism and the political interests of states has 
resulted in a discriminatory and exploitative system for humanitarian action within which 
political interests define and supersede humanitarian concerns. States are only eager to 
provide humanitarian assistance in the areas of humanitarianism that offer a politically-
expedient incentive for them to do so; they avoid areas of humanitarianism that run the risk of 
resulting in a negative political outcome or are likely to involve greater costs than benefits to 
themselves. As a result, states express much more willingness to commit to forms of 
humanitarian action that takes place “over there”, far away from their own territories and 
societies, such as humanitarian intervention. Not only does humanitarian intervention offer 
potential political benefits such as greater access to natural resources or establishing military 
bases of strategic importance on the territory of the state being intervened in, but is also 
carries little risk of having a direct negative impact on an intervening state’s own territory, 
security, resources, society, and so on. On the other hand, forms of humanitarian action 
requiring states to apply the principles of humanitarianism within their own space, such as 
refugee resettlement, are explicitly avoided by states. Not only do states perceive refugee 
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resettlement as a policy that requires greater costs than it provides benefits, but it also carries 
with it a politically-engineered sense of risk of having a direct negative impact at home. 
This was perfectly demonstrated in the case of Afghanistan. The US and its coalition partners 
did not hesitate to commit their military forces to Afghanistan in the name of global security 
and humanitarian justice, as chapter three highlighted. This was because Afghanistan 
represented the major battleground for international security, was a major strategic location in 
the Middle East, and provided an ideal access point to the abundant oil and natural gas 
reserves in the Caspian region.
21
 Deploying military troops to fight in Afghanistan also 
carried little risk of having a negative spill-over effect at home. In contrast, the likes of the 
US and Australia were unwilling to commit equally to assisting Afghanistan’s refugees, as 
highlighted in chapter six. They saw no incentive to bear the burden of refugee protection by 
agreeing to resettle Afghanistan’s vast number of refugees in their own countries. For these 
states, the political and material costs of resettling refugees greatly exceeded the benefits they 
could expect to derive, while it also ran a greater risk of negatively impacting their own 
countries. It is in this context that B.S. Chimni believes that, rather than promoting refugee 
protection, the underlying ideology of the international humanitarian regime is in fact 
contributing to “the systematic erosion of the core principles of refugee protection and rights 
in the name of a spurious realism”.22 While intervention in Afghanistan may have indeed 
served the political interests of the US and its allies, assisting the millions of refugees who 
were produced as a direct result of the intervention most certainly did not. As such, the 
containment of Afghanistan’s refugees was contrived through the UNHCR’s repatriation 
programme, while those who sought refuge through means of their own were met with 
varying degrees of western hostility. This neglect of Afghanistan’s refugees highlights the 
‘inhumanitarian’ nature of the intervention that took place in Afghanistan and once again 
exposes the inherent deficiencies of the international humanitarian regime.
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CONCLUSION:  
IMAGINING A BETTER HUMANITARIAN REGIME 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that the current system for international humanitarian action is 
fundamentally flawed and is in desperate need of reform of one variety or another. While the 
principles of humanitarianism have slowly been eroded over recent decades, the need for a 
more effective international humanitarian regime has only grown with the frequency of 
humanitarian catastrophes around the world. This need has prompted various scholars of 
international relations to consider some of the ways in which a more effective humanitarian 
regime might be devised. Incorporating everything from the embarrassingly modest to the 
absurdly ambitious, the propositions of these scholars fall broadly into two categories: 1) 
those that aim to ‘tweak’ the existing humanitarian regime, and 2) those that aim to remake 
the humanitarian system entirely. Theoretical prescriptions for reform in the realm of 
international politics can often prove to be an exercise in futility; nevertheless, considering 
alternatives to the existing system allows us to test the limits of what is possible in this 
regard. It is a useful tool for setting the parameters for thinking about the possible future of 
international humanitarianism.  
‘Tweaking’ the Existing System 
Successful humanitarian action is dependent upon international cooperation. Individual states 
are rarely equipped to address humanitarian crises on their own. However, to the detriment of 
those in need, most states are reluctant to commit to humanitarian action to solve problems 
that they do not perceive to be their concern. The result is that there is very little cooperation 
within the existing humanitarian regime and certain states continue to bear the brunt of 
humanitarian suffering while the international community turns a blind eye. This is 
particularly evident in the area of refugee protection because states perceive refugees as a 
‘burden’ that impacts negatively on their own national interests. For scholars such as Arthur 
C. Helton and Gill Loescher, the inherent lack of cooperation is the greatest shortcoming of 
the existing humanitarian regime.
1
 Without a pledge of support from states there can be no 
                                                 
1
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coordinated approach to solving humanitarian crises. And without a coordinated approach to 
solving humanitarian crises, humanitarian assistance is undertaken sporadically on an ad-hoc 
basis which undermines the effectiveness of the international humanitarian regime. 
Yet Helton and Loescher both remain optimistic about the possibility of bringing about a 
more cooperative humanitarian regime. They argue that all states have a direct interest in 
solving humanitarian crises because if they are left unattended they can have dire 
consequences for the entire world. A global consensus around the costs and benefits of 
humanitarian action is difficult to obtain because states are affected to such varying degrees 
by humanitarian crises. But Helton believes that international cooperation has foundered 
primarily because states do not properly understand the true costs and benefits associated 
with humanitarian action.
2
 For instance, while the potential negative aspects of accepting 
refugees are well documented, many states are unaware of the many positive benefits that can 
result from accepting refugees.
3
 The perception of humanitarian action as a ‘burden’ is 
therefore simply a misconstrued representation of humanitarianism by those states that are 
fortunate enough not to have to deal directly with humanitarian crises. For Helton and 
Loescher, changing this perception of humanitarianism can only be achieved through greater 
cooperation.
4
 A greater level of international cooperation promises to introduce clarity and 
consistency around humanitarian action, and to lower the transaction costs associated with 
humanitarian action in the same manner in which an insurance policy successfully spreads 
risk. 
To achieve greater cooperation within the international humanitarian regime Helton proposes 
a collective ‘insurance-like’ scheme for states to share the costs and risks associated with 
humanitarian action.
5
 He acknowledges that such a system would require a clear assessment 
of states’ various interests and incentives, which would naturally vary in different 
circumstances. To account for this he proposes “a process... not a model or fixed formula” 
based on deliberation among states whereby they would commit a ‘premium’ of resources to 
be used in a coordinated response should a humanitarian crisis occur. Helton’s optimistic 
proposition is tempered somewhat by the recognition that the inherent value of this 
‘insurance-like’ scheme is only likely to be recognised incrementally by continuing 
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humanitarian catastrophes. Nevertheless, he remains confident that the inadequacy of the 
existing solutions will encourage increasing cooperation in response to humanitarian crises. 
Loescher is also confident of a more cooperative humanitarian regime in the future. However, 
he believes that the framework for such a system is already in place within the existing 
political system. Loescher believes that greater cooperation on humanitarian issues is likely 
to result from the international dominance of the liberal democratic ideology because 
responding adequately to humanitarian crises around the world is a central tenet of liberalism. 
He claims that because providing assistance to those suffering is “essential to the preservation 
and functioning of open societies around the globe”,6 it indirectly serves the self-interests of 
the world’s leading democratic states. He rather optimistically anticipates that as liberal 
democracy spreads around the globe, states will be reluctant to ‘wall out’ the world’s 
displaced population because doing so would undermine the liberal democratic ideology. 
Remaking the International Humanitarian Regime 
For other scholars, the kind of minor ‘tweaks’ to the existing international humanitarian 
regime prescribed by Loescher and Helton are too modest and promise too little in the way of 
the instrumental change that is required. For scholars such as David Rieff, Mohammed 
Ayoob, and B.S. Chimni, it is the fusion of realpolitik with humanitarianism that lies at the 
heart of the problems with the existing humanitarian regime. This view is based on the 
traditional principle of political neutrality, which demands that political interests be kept 
clearly distinct from humanitarian activities in order to guard humanitarianism being 
associated with political affairs.
7
 The problems associated with the fusion of politics and 
humanitarianism have already been discussed in this thesis; the lives of humanitarian workers 
in Afghanistan often depended upon the ability of humanitarian agencies to convince the 
Taliban that their neutrality was bona fide.
8
 For these scholars, what is required to bring 
about a more effective humanitarian regime is the explicit division of politics from 
humanitarianism. In essence, this means the creation of an apolitical system for humanitarian 
action.  
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Foremost among the proponents of this view is David Rieff, whose central claim is that the 
fusion of political interests and humanitarianism is a perversion of humanitarianism. For 
Rieff, humanitarianism ‘must be either neutral or nothing’.9 This claim is founded upon 
humanitarian inviolability, or the legitimacy that is afforded to humanitarian workers by the 
principle of humanitarianism whereby they are provided with amnesty from attack. It is a 
concept that is at the core of humanitarianism, founded upon the twin pillars of neutrality and 
impartiality. The problem with the existing humanitarian regime is that the overt 
politicisation of humanitarian action has resulted in a sense of confusion as to what realm of 
activities genuinely ought to be protected as truly humanitarian, and inviolable on that 
basis.
10
 This confusion was never more evident than in the case of Afghanistan. On the one 
hand the US and its allies sought to portray themselves as the humanitarian rescuers of the 
suffering Afghan population. However, on the other hand they were fighting a self-interested 
war and rebuilding the Afghan state in accordance with their liberal ideology, while for 
political reasons they were rejecting the influx of Afghan refugees that resulted from this 
action. These activities were anything but apolitical in nature, and therefore remain outside 
the coverage afforded by the principle of humanitarian inviolability. 
In this context of this deceptive confusion, Rieff calls for a distinct division between 
humanitarianism and politics in order to protect the legitimacy and effectiveness of 
humanitarian action.
11
 He believes that states are too willing to engage in politicised 
humanitarianism, such as the waging of supposedly humanitarian wars, but are unwilling to 
commit equally to providing care to the human victims of humanitarian crises. It is this 
hypocritical application of humanitarianism that undermines the existing humanitarian 
regime. The collaboration of politics and humanitarianism may be a beneficial venture for 
states, from a humanitarian point of view it has been ineffective and has eroded the principles 
of humanitarianism. Humanitarianism should not be an instrument for states to pursue their 
political interests, nor should it be an instrument for states to pursue the creation of a ‘better’ 
world. Humanitarianism should not be, as Rieff suggests, “a catchall for the thwarted 
aspirations of our age”.12 It should simply be a means of providing care and assistance to 
those in the greatest of need. That is the fundamental purpose of humanitarianism and it must 
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be protected by protecting humanitarianism from becoming consumed by the political 
interests of states. 
Another proponent of this view is Mohammed Ayoob, who similarly argues that decisions to 
undertake humanitarian action are not supposed to be subject to the logic of realpolitik, and if 
they are, then such actions are not humanitarian in character. The purpose of humanitarianism 
is not to “provide major powers the facility to intervene selectively in the domestic affairs of 
weaker states”.13 To prevent humanitarianism from being exploited in this way, Ayoob 
argues that the authority for authorising humanitarian action needs to supersede the state 
level.
14
 This is necessitated by the fact that states within the existing system have proven 
unwilling to respond to humanitarian crises that do not serve their own interests. From this 
point we are faced with the questions: how might such an apolitical humanitarian regime be 
constructed? And where might the authority for authorising humanitarian action rest if not 
with states? 
One alternative to a system dominated by states is an international humanitarian regime 
controlled by international organisations. In particular, it has been suggested that such a 
regime could incorporate the various humanitarian organisations of the United Nations under 
a single umbrella (for instance, the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Responses, 
UNOHR).
15
 This unified humanitarian agency would have a non-political mandate to 
coordinate a coherent response to humanitarian crises around the world. It would be 
responsible for identifying the worst cases of humanitarian suffering around the world and 
allocating funds and resources accordingly to address these crises. This supra-agency would 
be endowed with the ability to designate humanitarian assistance solely on the basis of need, 
without any consideration of the political dividends that may result from providing this 
assistance. Providing this agency with decision-making authority that supersedes the state 
level would serve to protect humanitarianism from political exploitation and redefine the 
humanitarian foundations of the international humanitarian regime. 
The success of a UNOHR-like organisation would be dependent upon a significant degree of 
institutional change from within the United Nations. This change would be required in order 
to overcome the kinds of institutional barriers to success that have plagued the UNHCR in 
                                                 
13
 Ayoob, 'Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty'. p.96. 
14
 Ibid. p.96. 
15
 Helton, The Price of Indifference: Refugees and Humanitarian Action in the New Century. p.262. 
  
101 
 
recent decades. As chapter five of this thesis highlighted, the UNHCR’s ability to fulfil its 
humanitarian goals has been consistently hampered by its lack of autonomy; its dependence 
upon its donors governments for financial support has placed the organisation in a feeble 
position to challenge the policies of its funders, despite the fact that these policies often 
directly hamper the UNHCR’s ability to adequately fulfil its mandate.16 The UN would 
therefore need to provide much greater autonomy to its humanitarian supra-organisation, 
particularly fiscal autonomy. In practice, this would mean that states would remain 
responsible for funding such an organisation, just as they do within the current structure of 
the United Nations. However, they would not be afforded the right of stipulating how their 
funds would be spent or to earmark resources for particular crises. Only then would this 
organisation truly possess the autonomy it requires to pursue genuine humanitarian goals, 
confront governments when necessary on humanitarian policies, and fulfil its role as the 
international ‘watch dog’ on humanitarian issues.17  
A second alternative to the existing humanitarian regime is a system within which 
humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) occupy a much greater role. After all, 
humanitarian NGOs are the primary implementing agencies of humanitarian action today and 
are often times the driving force behind the provision of humanitarian assistance.
18
 Helton 
explains how the failure of states to respond to humanitarian crises in the developing world 
has “given NGOs prominent roles on the ground”. It has enabled them to act “not only as the 
primary representatives of the international community, but also increasingly provide public 
goods in the absence of functional states”.19 Furthermore, because many NGOs do not have 
to contend with the restrictions that donor states place on their funding they have begun to 
take on an increasingly larger share of humanitarian resources than ever before in a bid to 
reach those neglected by the state-dominated system. A system dominated by NGOs would 
be much better equipped to address humanitarian crises in a coordinated and consistent 
manner because, once again, humanitarian action would not be defined by any sense of 
political self-interest. 
The major obstacles to the success of a system run by NGOs are related to the lack of 
authority and autonomy that NGOs possess. Within the existing system, many NGOs allow 
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donor states to be involved in the design and management of their operations. The result is 
that their operations often come to incorporate various political interests and ideologies.
20
 
This is particularly the case among American NGOs of the ‘Wilsonian’ tradition. Wilsonian 
NGOs perceive an inherent compatibility between humanitarian goals and US foreign policy, 
which stems from US President Woodrow Wilson’s ambition of projecting US values and 
influence as a force for good in the world. However, this has resulted in many NGOs 
becoming, or being perceived as, little more than ‘government contractors’. This has had 
obvious implications for their perceptions of neutrality on the ground.
21
 For this reason, 
associations of this nature between NGOs and states must be guarded against in a 
humanitarian regime controlled by NGOs. Such a system must be premised upon political 
neutrality and autonomy from the political agendas of dominant states. 
Many European NGOs operate on this basis by maintaining a higher ratio of private to public 
funding in order to protect their neutrality.
22
 Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), for instance, 
has a policy of allowing no more than 50% of their total funds to come from governments. It 
also refuses funding from governments that are belligerents in a conflict, including US money 
for its operations in Afghanistan. This method of operation has been a success largely thanks 
to the economic integration of the European Union, which has provided NGOs in Europe 
with considerably more latitude in choosing between government funding sources. An NGO-
dominated regime within an increasingly integrated global economic system could hope to 
operate in a similar manner. Such a system would invariably remain dependent upon the 
support and cooperation of states for funding, provision of resources, and authorisation to 
operate within their territories. However, within such a system states would remain 
responsible for providing humanitarian assistance, yet this assistance would be in accordance 
with established international humanitarian norms rather than in return for political dividends. 
The Ongoing Challenge of State Sovereignty 
While the minor ‘tweaks’ to the existing humanitarian regime may be criticised for being too 
modest in nature to bring about the change required, the radical propositions for remaking the 
system may equally be accused of being too detached from the reality of international 
politics. Isolating humanitarianism from the competitive realm of realpolitik by creating an 
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apolitical humanitarian regime may be appealing to idealist theorists, but it remains difficult 
to foresee how such a system would operate in reality. The fundamental problem with radical 
prescriptions of this nature is that they fail to account for the fact that ultimate authority and 
power within international politics rests with states due to the sovereignty they possess.
23
 
States retain both the legal right and the de facto ability to exercise their authority within their 
own territory. No rules of international law are binding upon states but those they have 
created for themselves through their consent. Yet in a material sense even when states 
consent to binding rules and regulations they do not surrender any of their sovereignty as they 
remain capable of disobeying these laws should they threaten their own interests. In both a 
normative and a material sense therefore, there is no authority within international politics 
higher than that held by states. 
In this sense state sovereignty poses an ongoing challenge to the realisation of any 
humanitarian regime that is controlled by any actor other than states themselves. In the 
radical prescriptions above, states are expected to give up their decision-making capability on 
issues such as the number of refugees they admit within their borders or whether their troops 
are deployed as part of a humanitarian intervention. However, this is an unrealistic 
expectation that contradicts the reality of international politics. Put simply, because no higher 
authority exists to dictate to states against their will, in a conflict of interest situation it is the 
will of states that will ultimately prevail within its own territory. 
The incessant competition between states leads to a situation where they will utilise whatever 
means are at their disposal to gain an advantage over each other; this includes the exploitation 
of humanitarianism as a means for pursuing their interests. An apolitical humanitarian regime 
would therefore only stand a chance of success in the presence of a sovereign authority above 
that of states. For Hans Morgenthau, what is required to bring about such a regime is not the 
limitation of the exercise of national sovereignty through international obligations and 
institutions, but rather “a radical transformation of the existing international society of 
sovereign nations into a supranational community of individuals”.24 He argues that just as 
domestic order is secured within sovereign states, global order among nations can only be 
secured within a world state comprised of all nations in the world. In his eyes, this world state 
would perform three functions: (1) it would give humanity a legal personality which would 
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keep the unity of mankind before its eyes; (2) it would create and keep in motion agencies for 
positive worldwide social change; (3) it would establish enforcement agencies that would 
meet any threat to the common good with overwhelming strength.
25
 Within such a system, 
the major problems facing humanity, whether war, environmental degradation, or 
humanitarian crises, would be met by a comprehensive and consistent response from a world 
authority whose interest would be invested equally in the welfare of all peoples rather than a 
select group. 
But on the possible existence of such a world, Morgenthau’s pessimism is overwhelmingly 
apparent. He acknowledges that the peoples of the world today are not willing to put the 
welfare of all of humanity ahead of that of their own nation, and that the nation remains the 
recipient of humankind’s highest secular loyalties.26 For, while they are willing to sacrifice 
themselves and die for the survival of their nation, they are unwilling to do so in the interests 
of greater humanity. As Morgenthau explains, “they are not prepared to perform... that 
unprecedented moral and political revolution which would force the nation from its throne 
and put the political organisation of humanity on it”.27 As such, the realisation of an altruistic 
international humanitarian regime whose operations firmly reflect the principles of 
humanitarianism remains confined to the realm of hopeless idealism. Such a system requires 
a global community that is willing and able to support it. Yet it appears that at the heart of 
human nature exists a malignant sense of selfishness that remains incompatible with the 
principles of humanitarianism. The future of international humanitarianism remains heavily 
dependent upon the extent to which nations are able to restrain this selfish nature in the 
interests of all humanity. While the extent to which they are capable of doing so remains to 
be seen, recent history has left little room for optimism. 
 
It is clear that the existing international humanitarian regime is in crisis. The case of 
Afghanistan highlighted that humanitarian assistance today is provided by states whose 
primary motivation for doing so is based not on the principles of humanitarianism, but on 
their own self-interests. Put simply, states provide assistance to those crises that are deemed 
to be politically-expedient and neglect those, such as the Afghan refugee crisis, that are not. 
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This results in the inconsistent and selective application of humanitarian action which 
undermines both its effectiveness and the principles upon which international 
humanitarianism is founded. In a bid to reconnect the international humanitarian regime to its 
foundational principles, various scholars of international relations have called for the de-
politicisation of the existing regime so as to limit the degree of control and influence that 
states enjoy over the direction of international humanitarianism. However, the realisation of 
such a system remains unrealistic under the present moral, social, and political conditions of a 
world dominated by sovereign states. International politics is defined by competition for 
power; so long as states remain locked in this competition any conception of higher morality 
yields to selfish realism. This includes the concept of humanitarianism, whose future role in 
international politics is consequently becoming increasingly dubious. 
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